Pound\u27s Century, and Ours by Tidmarsh, Jay
Notre Dame Law School
NDLScholarship
Journal Articles Publications
2006
Pound's Century, and Ours
Jay Tidmarsh
Notre Dame Law School, jay.h.tidmarsh.1@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Legal History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 513 (2005-2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/243
POUND'S CENTURY, AND OURS
Jay Tidmarsh*
INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 1906, a little known Nebraska lawyer climbed to
the podium at the twenty-ninth American Bar Association convention
in St. Paul, Minnesota, and commenced the most thoroughly success-
ful revolution in American law. The success of the revolution has
been so complete that it swept clean lawyers' collective memory of
what it had replaced, obliterated a system that had taken centuries to
construct, killed off an entire vocabulary, and inverted the way in
which every lawyer-every person, really-thinks about the law. In
the words of John Henry Wigmore, who was present, the speech was
"the spark that kindled the white flame of progress."1
The lawyer was Roscoe Pound, and the title of his address was The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.2 The
speech was hardly popular in its own time. The ABA nearly refused to
publish the remarks.3 Thirty-two years would pass before Pound's
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank Howie Erichson for useful
discussions, and Joe Bauer and Roger Trangsrud for their helpful comments on a
draft of this Article.
1 John Henry Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906: The Spark that
Kindled the White Hame of Progress, 2 0J. AM. JuMcAruRE Soc'v 176, 176 (1937) (stating
that the speech "struck the spark that kindled the white flame of high endeavor, now
spreading through the entire legal profession"). Wigmore's words are engraved on a
plaque commemorating the speech. A picture of the plaque can be seen in Proceed-
ings in Commemoration of the Address Delivered in St. Paul, Minnesota, August 26, 1906, by
Dean Roscoe Pound Before a Convention of the American Bar Association, 35 F.R.D. 241, 259
(1964).
2 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJus-
tice, 29 REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964) [hereinafter Pound,
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction].
3 A biography of Pound recounts the debate over the speech's publication, see
DAVID WIGDOR, RoscoE POUND 126-29 (1974), as does a commemorative essay by
Wigmore, see Wigmore, supra note 1. Wigdor's biography is excellent, but Wigmore
has the advantage in the recounting because he was an eyewitness to the speech and
ensuing debate. For further discussion of the debate over the speech's publication,
see infta notes 307-14 and accompanying text.
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seeds fully flowered. 4 Even today, many of Pound's criticisms of our
adversarial civil justice system ring as true as the day that Pound spoke.
Nor was the revolution that Pound wanted to foment exactly the
revolution that occurred.
Pound's insight was to make procedure and substance work in an
integrated fashion. In England (and eventually America), procedure
had dominated substance for much of the time since the eleventh
century. The question often was not "What substantive right has the
defendant violated?" but rather "What legal form, with what procedu-
ral attributes, must the plaintiff use to assert the claim?" As Maine
famously observed, "[s] o great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions
[i.e., common law procedure] . .. that substantive law has at first the
look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure."5
The energy devoted to constructing a procedural system yielded doz-
ens of technical terms-such as the praecipe quod reddat, the capias ad
4 In 1934, Congress enacted the Rules Enabling Act, which invested in the Su-
preme Court the power to create uniform rules of procedure for federal courts. Act
of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071-2077 (2000)). Years in the making, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Ena-
bling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (discussing history of the statute's
enactment);Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494 (1986) (same), the Enabling Act placed the creation of procedural rules in
the hands of the Supreme Court. The Court then composed an Advisory Committee
to draft the rules, precisely as Pound had recommended. Roscoe Pound, A Practical
Program of Procedural Reform, 22 GREEN BAG 438, 443, 448 (1910) [hereinafter Pound,
Practical Program]; see also Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L.
REV. 388, 402-03 (1910) [hereinafter Pound, Principles (Part I)]. The rules that
emerged, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, went into effect in 1938. See Order of
December 20, 1937, 302 U.S. 783 (1937); Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
Some of the ideas that Pound espoused found earlier expression in the Equity
Rules of 1912, see Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226
U.S. 627 (1912), which in turn heavily influenced the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Before crafting the Equity Rules, the Supreme Court received significant input
from a committee of the ABA that had been constituted as a result of Pound's speech,
on which he sat, and into whose deliberations he had significant input. See Austin W.
Scott, Pound's Influence on Civil Procedure, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1568 (1965).
5 SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOMS 389
(Arno Press 1975) (1886); see also S.F.C. MILsOM, HISTORIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
COMMON LAW 59 (2d ed. 1981) ("There was no substantive law to which pleading was
adjective. These were the terms in which the law existed and in which lawyers
thought."); Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 617 (1908)
[hereinafter Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence] (claiming that "[lawyers] lose sight of
the end of procedure, they make scientific procedure an end of itself, and thus, in the
result, make adjective law an agency for defeating or delaying substantive law and
justice instead of one for enforcing or speeding them").
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respondendum, the demurrer, the general issue, the plea in avoidance,
the traverse, and the wager of law-whose meanings would have been
clear to lawyers one hundred years ago, and whose intricacies often
determined the outcome of cases.
The system for which Pound advocated was based on the classic
model of equity, in which procedure (in theory) never got in the way
of deciding cases on the merits. It was, as Pound said, 'justice without
law." 6 Procedural rules should be general, discretionary guidelines
placed into the hands of judges whose scientific administration would
lead to the just determination of each case. 7 Increased judicial in-
volvement would constrain the excesses of the adversarial system. The
substantive merits would determine the outcome.
The procedural system we developed in the twentieth century
clung closely to the specifics of Pound's proposals. But we never fully
integrated procedure and substance. Instead, we now have a system in
which the importance of substance and procedure has been inverted.
Substance now dominates procedure. The promise of Pound's inte-
grated approach remains illusive. To some extent the fault is Pound's,
for he failed to appreciate that his "on the merits" approach invited
subjugation rather than integration of procedure. But subjugation
was not Pound's objective. We have comprehended only dimly the
meaning of the prophet, and have focused on concrete actions rather
than on the imaginative call to action.
I wish to step back from the details of our present schizoid efforts
at incremental procedural reform-in which we simultaneously en-
trust more power to judges and pursue ever more detailed procedural
codes-in order to make two larger observations. One is fairly evi-
dent, and the other will take most of this Article to explain.
First, let me justify my claim that the procedural revolution
Pound commenced was the most thoroughly successful one in twenti-
eth-century American law. Given the contested nature of the details
of our procedural system, my claim might seem surprising. My mea-
sure of success, however, lies on the grand scale, not in the particular.
The revolution was successful because, when ultimately put into ac-
tion, it made procedure an irrelevant consideration in thinking about
substantive law. Milsom may well have been right that the measure of
a mature legal system is its ability to think in categories of substantive
6 Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 20, 24 (1905) [herein-
after Pound, Decadence]; see also Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at
398, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 275 (1964); Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13
COLUM. L. REv. 696, 696-705 (1913) [hereinafter Justice (Part I)].
7 Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4, at 388-89.
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rather than procedural law.8 By that measure, Pound helped to make
us mature. When we ask what rule we should use to declare a design
defect in a product, or what the level of scienter should be for corpo-
rate wrongdoing, or what rule should apply to affirmative action pro-
grams, we do not stop to ask how we propose to enforce the rights
under consideration. Instead, those who argue about the terms of
substantive law assume procedural enforcement is possible. At best,
difficulties of enforcement are secondary considerations. Today in
the academy, procedure is often a second-class subject, thought to be
a practically oriented matter devoid of insight and unworthy of sus-
tained thought. We take for granted that cases will be, or at least
ought to be, decided on their merits. How that is accomplished is a
matter of mere practice and detail.
In this forum, my claim that procedure has become an academic
backwater is singing to the choir; those interested enough to read this
Article know what I mean. Although I once thought that perhaps it
was, the insight is not original to me. By the turn of the last century,
even before Pound's speech, American lawyers were beginning to dis-
cuss the law in substantive terms, without filtering their thinking
through procedural categories.9 Pound too observed a nascent ten-
dency to assume away the procedural dimensions of a problem, and to
focus only on the substance. 10 He thought the tendency unfortunate.
I will observe only that the tendency has not diminished over the
years.
My second observation is more controversial: it is again time to
consider bold reforms to our procedural system. Today our system
faces pressures and challenges across numerous fronts, and modest
tweaking of this rule or that doctrine cannot address the system's fun-
damental crisis. Reforming procedural systems is not an easy task. Ex-
pectations about litigation become settled, and the status quo
becomes reinforced by the hundred thousand lawyers who do quite
well under the present system, thank you very much. The system
8 MILSOM, supra note 5, at 44, 59, 94.
9 The classic text is The Common Law, a masterful series of lectures in which Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes cut through the procedural niceties of the common law writs to
distill the substantive principles within. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). But progress was fitful.
For one example of a court imperfectly struggling to convert once-dominant procedu-
ral categories into substantive principles, see Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis.
1891).
10 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L.
REv. 489, 514 (1912) [hereinafter Pound, Scope and Purpose (Part III)].
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Pound criticized had become stale three centuries earlier. So it is pos-
sible to limp along with an outdated system for quite a while.
But we shouldn't have to. Some of the pressures on the system
will not wait another century before exploding. The time for clear-
eyed critique and for imagination about the next procedural moment
is now. To be successful, however, we must recover a sense of the
importance of procedure-a sense that Pound himself possessed but
that has been lost as we implemented what we thought were Pound's
insights.
Like Pound's speech, most of this Article will be critique-explor-
ing the challenges that make our present procedural system unstable,
rather than proposing a positive agenda for reform. The pressures
that make our procedural system ripe for reimagining can be broken
down and categorized in any of a number of fashions. For my pur-
poses, I will package them into four categories that I describe in Part
II: competitive pressures, political accountability, representativeness,
and theorization. In Part III, I suggest several issues to which future
reform efforts must pay special attention. But first, in Part I, I de-
scribe Pound's vision, the parts of the vision we kept, and the parts we
forgot.
I. POUND'S CENTURY
Pound's "spark" looks less radical when we consider the kindling
on which it rested. Many of his procedural ideas found prior voice in
Bentham's critiques of the British system, the mid-century code re-
form efforts of New York's David Dudley Field, England's Judicature
Act of 1873, and the works of contemporary continental philoso-
phers." But so much depends on timing. In the reform-minded
11 Pound acknowledged these influences on his own work. See, e.g., Pound,
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 408 (citing JEREmY BENTHAM, FRAG-
MENT ON GOVERNMENT (1776)), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 283-84 (1964); Roscoe
Pound, Enforcement of Law, 20 GREEN BAG 401, 403-05 (1908) [hereinafter Pound,
Enforcement] (discussing leading schools of nineteenth-century Germanic jurispru-
dence); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 610-13 (discussing ancient
and modern works of jurisprudence, including continental philosophers and Ben-
tham); Pound, Practical Program, supra note 4, at 443-44 (discussing Field's code
pleading system in New York and the Judicature Act); Pound, Principles (Part I), supra
note 4, at 403-04 (mentioning the Judicature Act). His most ambitious historical
survey ofjurisprudential thought was a three-part article entitled The Scope and Purpose
of Sociological Jurisprudence. See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Juris-
prudence, 24 HAjv. L. REv. 591 (1911); Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociologi-
cal Jurisprudence, 25 IARv. L. REv. 140 (1911) [hereinafter Pound, Scope and Purpose
(Part II)]; Pound, Scope and Purpose (Part III), supra note 10. -The greatest influence on
Pound was Rudolf von Jhering, a nineteenth-century German philosopher whom
2006]
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spirit of the early twentieth century, when the country found itself will-
ing to reexamine foundational assumptions about American life, 12
Pound supplied the ready critique of the legal system and the call to
action. His 1906 speech marked the beginning of the reform move-
ment that led directly to the creation of the gold standard of modern
procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in 1938.
Trained in botany,' 3 Pound applied scientific methods to his
analysis of law. He saw law as an organism in need of synthesis and
systematization, of diagnosis and prescription. As a result, Pound did
not see procedure in a vacuum. In his comprehensive view, proce-
dure was one of the vital systems that helped law to fulfill its organic
objective-which, in Pound's mind, was the administration of justice
according to the moral norms of a society. 14 Pound's diagnosis of the
legal organism in 1900 was that too much dissonance existed between
the law as it was functioning and people's sense of and desire for jus-
tice. In a democracy, such dissatisfaction with justice was a cancer that
bred lawlessness and contempt for the law, and thus threatened the
health of the entire social structure. The etiology of the cancer was
what we would call today "legal formalism," or what Pound called
"mechanical jurisprudence": the deductive application of legal rules
that bore little relation to and took little account of social conditions.
The cure was "sociological jurisprudence."
Pound regarded as the father of his own sociological jurisprudence but whose name
Pound often rendered as "Ihering." See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 5,
at 610; Pound, Scope and Purpose (Part II), supra, at 140-47.
12 See Pound, Practical Program, supra note 4, at 439 (describing a "general move-
ment in all departments of mental activity away from the purely formal, away from
hard and fast notions, away from traditional categories" that was infecting science,
history, political theory, economics, and sociology and was "changing our attitude
toward all problems of social life").
13 Born in 1870, Nathan Roscoe Pound was the son of a respected Nebraska
judge. In 1888, at the age of seventeen, he graduated from the University of Nebraska
with a degree in botany, and matriculated at Harvard Law School the following year.
Because of his father's poor health, he did not return to law school for a second year,
but instead sat immediately for the bar in Nebraska. He became a member of the bar
in 1890, and quickly became a successful lawyer. As he was developing his practice, he
commenced graduate work in botany, and obtained a Ph.D. in 1897. In 1898, he
coauthored an important work on botanical specimens in Nebraska that led both to
international awards and to his ultimate recognition as America's first ecologist. See
WIGDOR, supra note 3, at 3-67.
14 See, e.g., Pound, Decadence, supra note 6, at 20 (stating that "the object of law is
the administration of justice" and defining "laws" as "general rules recognized or en-
forced in the administration ofjustice"); Roscoe Pound, The Need of a SociologicalJuris-
prudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 612 (1907) [hereinafter Pound, Need].
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The basic idea of sociological jurisprudence was to bring the in-
sights of the social sciences-economics, history, sociology, and the
like-to bear on the law, in order to make the law conform to the
needs and aspirations of an industrializing, urbanizing society.1 5 The
common law was too individualistic to meet the needs of the modern
world, and in any event had become so rigid and mechanical in its
operation that it had lost sight of the effects of its rules on society:
"Conceptions are fixed. The premises are no longer to be examined.
Everything is reduced to simple deduction from them. Principles
cease to have importance. The law becomes a body of rules. This is
the condition against which sociologists now protest, and rightly." 16
Legislation was the only way to smash through this ossified legal
system, and it needed to be written and administered in a way that
accounted for social realities. 17 The law professor as social scientist
would lead the way in knocking down outmoded legal categories;",
people's needs and aspirations would match up fairly well with the
laws on the books; and popular support for and compliance with the
law would replace popular dissatisfaction with the legal system.
I do not wish to debate here whether sociological jurisprudence
was a branch of legal realism, a form of proto-realism, or some third
15 See, e.g., Pound, Need, supra note 14, at 610-12. Although he used the word
with great frequency, Pound never precisely defined the meaning of "justice." Given
his general antipathy toward the natural law jurisprudence of his day, see WIGDOR,
supra note 3, at 118, 166-68, and given his general preference for cutting-edge social
scientific insights to determine the direction of the evolving legal organism, Pound
probably held no fixed view ofjustice, but saw it simply as the extant moral norms and
aspirations of a particular society. To Pound, these norms had a claim on law that
distinguished his jurisprudence from a rank positivism. See id. at 167-68. Pound's
early jturisprudence is perhaps best described as methodological, focusing on the
structures and intellectual habits that would foster a just society rather than trying to
determine the content of the norms in such a society. See Pound, Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 399 ("Justice, which is the end of law, is the ideal com-
promise between the activities of each and the activities of all in a crowded world."),
reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 276 (1964); id. (describing "conflicting ideas ofjustice" in a
"divided and diversified" community), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 276 (1964); Pound,
Enforcement, supra note 11, at 403 ("Not liberation of energies but satisfaction of wants
is made the central point. They are defining social justice.").
16 Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 612.
17 See Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 401-03; Pound, Mechanical Jurispru-
dence, supra note 5, at 612; Pound, Need, supra note 14, at 613-14.
18 Pound, Need, supra note 14, at 615 ("To this end it is the duty of teachers of
law, while they teach scrupulously the law that the courts administer, to teach it in the
spirit and from the standpoint of the political, economic, and sociological learning of
to-day.").
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thing.19 As with the realists, Pound's target was legal formalism in all
its manifestations, and his early work brimmed with both caustic ap-
praisal of the weaknesses of the existing system and infectious opti-
mism that these weaknesses could be overcome with simple bromides.
He was a master taxonomist, assigning three causes for this phenome-
non or diagnosing four flaws in that phenomenon. In one of his most
systematic efforts at diagnosis, he argued that the dissatisfaction with
the legal system had four dimensions: (1) a shift in the people's sense
ofjustice, from the individual to the group, from property to person,
and from legal to social justice; (2) the "conflict between legal theory
and judicial practice in the application of law"; (3) common law theo-
ries that frustrated administrative action by the executive branch and
forced excessive administrative responsibilities on judges who were ill
equipped to handle the work; and (4) "the backwardness of judicial
organization and procedure." 20
For Pound, the disconnection between justice and law resulted in
some measure from the inevitable growing pains of a legal system that
was in the process of switching from the common law to legislation for
its foundation. 21 For Pound, legislation posed certain challenges. He
was a traditionalist, believed in the genius of the common law
method, and had little sympathy for the populist movement that fu-
eled a great deal of the legislative initiative. 22 In order for legislation
to be sound, it needed to reflect social scientific insights that would
bring social justice and law together.2 3 As important, in order to be
19 Although he found aspects of legal realism useful, Pound maintained distance
between his own theories and those who are generally acknowledged as the leading
legal realists. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REv.
697 (1931) [hereinafter Pound, Realist Jurisprudence]. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM 6-7, 49-50 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) (discussing Pound's rela-
tionship to legal realism); WIGDOR, supra note 3, at 256-75 (discussing transformation
of Pound's thought in response to legal realism).
20 Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 402.
21 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 403-04, 415, reprinted in
35 F.R.D. 273, 280-81, 289 (1964); Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 401-02.
Pound also recognized numerous other causes of popular dissatisfaction, some of
which were inevitable in any system of law. Among them were the mechanical (or
formalistic) operation of rules, the lag between popular opinion and legal change,
the mistaken but common view that administering justice is an easy matter, and the
human dislike of any restraint on freedom. Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction,
supra note 2, at 397-402, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 275-79 (1964). But he also
thought that many of the causes were particular to the American system of the time.
Id. at 397, 402-16, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 275, 279-90 (1964).
22 WIGDOR, supra note 3, at 72-74.
23 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12, 30, 35-36
(1910) [hereinafter Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action].
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effective, legislation required excellent administration. One of the in-
evitable difficulties of legislation, however socially just in principle,
was its breadth-its inability to tailor itself to the equities of each situa-
tion in which it might apply. Disdaining what we would today call a
textualist approach, 24 Pound argued for the equitable tailoring of leg-
islation to the facts of each circumstance-in essence, a common law
approach that considered the purpose of the legislation in relation to
the individuals it affected.2 5
The way to achieve equitable tailoring was discretion. Discretion
lay at the heart of Pound's jurisprudence. 26 As "a proper quality of
administration," discretion allowed government officials to apply so-
cial scientific insights and thus give proper effect to legislation en-
acted pursuant to social scientific principles.2 7 Pound recognized the
costs of discretion: disuniformity, uncertainty, unpredictability in com-
mercial transactions and industrial undertakings, and lack of security
of property. 28 Because "mechanical action" was a "proper quality of
law," he believed that some certainty and stability in legal rules were
24 Today academic debate rages over the merits of a textualist (or "faithful
agent") approach as opposed to an "intentionalist" (or "cooperative partner") ap-
proach. Compare, e.g., WiLLAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994) (arguing that an intentionalist approach is often justified), and William N.
Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001) (finding historical roots for
nontextualist approach), withJohn F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2001) (claiming an originalist basis for textualism), and Caleb
Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347 (2005) (analyzing differences between
textualists and intentionalists). Pound called the textualist approach the "literal
school," and he had few good things to say about it:
[T]he whole human element is excluded. The process and the result are
conceived of as something purely logical and scientific. If the result chances
to be just, so much the better. But justice in the cause in hand is not the
chief end. The facts of concrete causes are to be thrown into the judicial
sausage-mill and are to be ground into uniformity; and the resulting sausage
is to be labeled justice.
Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 404.
25 See Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 409; Roscoe Pound, Justice According to
Law, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 103 (1914) [hereinafter Pound, Justice (Part III)]; Pound,
Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 621-23; see also WIGDOR, supra note 3, at 220.
26 Many of Pound's essays and speeches put into opposition the "mechanical" or
"technical" (in other words, the self-referent formalistic) element in law and the "dis-
cretionary," "scientific," or "flexible" element. See, e.g., Pound, Decadence, supra note
6, at 20; Pound, Justice (Part III), supra note 25; Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, supra
note 5, at 621-23.
27 Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 409.
28 Id. at 407-08.
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desirable. 29 He saw the movement of law through history as a pendu-
lum swinging from excessive certainty to excessive discretion and
back. By the early 1900s, the pendulum had swung too far in the di-
rection of the certain and the mechanical. 30 The goal was to find a
proper balance between certainty and discretion. In striking the bal-
ance, he warned not to "overvalue certainty."3 1
In general terms, Pound supported aspects of the emerging ad-
ministrative state (especially its turn to social science), and he looked
on with horror at Lochnerian efforts to stymie social legislation.3 2 But
Pound was never fond of "executive justice,"3 3 and always believed
that an independentjudiciary should be the principal organ for trans-
mitting social scientific principles into action. 34 That fact drew ques-
tions of procedure to the very center of his thinking:
[T] he controlling reason for a systematic and scientific adjective law
must be to insure precision, uniformity and certainty in the judicial
application of substantive law.... Hence full, equal and exact solu-
tions of controversies of fact are at least as important to the public
as scientific adjustment of legal standards to the facts when
determined. 35
Although he believed that procedure was instrumental and ought to
be subservient to substance,3 Pound's integration of substance and
29 Id. at 409; see also Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4, at 388-89.
30 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 397-98, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 275-76 (1964); Pound, Decadence, supra note 6, at 20-26. Pound also ar-
gued that the mechanical, formalistic approach of the early twentieth century had not
eliminated judicial discretion, but instead had driven it underground and perverted
its proper exercise. See Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 406-07.
31 Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 408.
32 Id. at 409; see also Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at
406-07, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 282-83 (1964); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,
supra note 5, at 615-16. On the judicial activism of the era dominated by Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), see KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 492-503 (15th ed. 2004).
33 "Executive justice" was Pound's phrase to describe the goal of administrative
regulation and enforcement. See Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
12 (1914) [hereinafter Pound, Justice (Part II)].
34 See id. at 24-26; Pound, Justice (Part III), supra note 25, at 120-21. As his own
views hardened later in his life, Pound's opposition to the New Deal agencies was
virulent. WIGODOR, supra note 3, at 266-74.
35 Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4, at 388.
36 See Roscoe Pound, Cardinal Principles To Be Observed in Reforming Procedure, 75
CENT. L.J. 150, 153 (1912) [hereinafter Pound, Cardinal Principles] (noting that "the
vindication [of substantive law] is the sole ground of having procedural rules at all");
Pound, Practical Program, supra note 4, at 438 (stating that "we are evidently about to
enter upon a period of liberality in which the substance shall prevail and the machin-
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procedure is unique among American legal philosophers in the ex-
tent to which he saw social justice and its administration as inextrica-
bly interwoven. 3
7
Not surprisingly, Pound thought that discretion was vital to effec-
tive adjudication. "[W] ithin wide limits [the judge] should be free to
deal with the individual case so as to meet the demands of justice be-
tween the parties and accord with the reason and moral sense of ordi-
nary men."3 8  Because the application of law "is not a purely
mechanical process," the judicial process "involves, not logic merely,
but discretion; ... the cause is not to be fitted to the rule but the rule
to the cause."39
Pound proposed to foster judicial discretion in adjudication pri-
marily through greater flexibility in procedure. "The demand for
wider discretion in the courts may be satisfied legitimately in the di-
rection of procedure," he argued. 40 The procedural system of the day
failed his demand miserably. Problems in 'judicial organization and
procedure" were "the most efficient causes of dissatisfaction with the
present administration of justice in America."41 Other causes of dis-
satisfaction, like the movement from an individualistic common law
age to the collectivist era of legislation, would eventually "take care of
themselves. But too much of the current dissatisfaction has a just ori-
gin in our judicial organization and procedure. '42
Pound's 1906 speech was his central effort to identify the defi-
ciencies in the procedural system. His criticisms can be generally or-
ganized into three categories 43 : (1) outmoded and rigid procedural
ery of justice shall be restrained by and made strictly to serve the end for which it
exists"); id. at 439 ("Adjective law is but an instrument... for the enforcement of the
substantive law, to be judged as such .... ").
37 The importance that Pound attached to procedural issues is evidenced by the
fact that many of Pound's early speeches and papers involve primarily procedural
topics. Even in his broader jurisprudential essays, Pound often devoted a sizable sec-
tion to questions of procedure, or used examples from procedural history to make
broader jurisprudential points. See, e.g., Pound, Decadence, supra note 6 (using history
of law and equity to argue against legal formalism); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,
supra note 5 (devoting slightly less than half of the essay to issues of procedure).
38 Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 405.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 408.
41 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 408, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 284 (1964)
42 Id. at 416, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 290 (1964).
43 Because of his own taxonomy for discussing problems of popular dissatisfac-
tion, Pound's criticisms of procedure were sprinkled throughout his speech rather
than concentrated in a single place or on a single list. The synthesis in the text does
no violence to Pound's concerns. See also Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 410
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rules or doctrines; (2) antiquated organization of the nation's court
systems; and (3) the lack of professionalism and independence of the
judiciary. Both of the latter criticisms resulted in significant re-
forms, 4 4 but here I wish to focus on his criticisms of procedure, which
ranged from the broad to the mundane.45 One significant concern
was the age-old "Chinese Wall" that many states and the federal system
maintained between law and equity; to Pound, the distinction was
both an irrelevancy in modern times and a wasteful technicality that
too often determined the outcomes of cases. 46 A more specific con-
cern-the "lavish" willingness to grant new trials because of technical
(listing "backwardness ofjudicial organization and procedure" as one of four princi-
pal causes of dissatisfaction, but not discussing it in detail).
44 On judicial organization, Pound praised modernizing changes made by the
federal courts in the late nineteenth century. See Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfac-
tion, supra note 2, at 412 (calling organization of federal courts "a model of flexible
judicial organization"), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 287 (1964). See generally RicHARD H.
FALLON,JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
36-38 (5th ed. 2003) (describing the major changes). Many state courts had not yet
caught up with these reforms when Pound spoke. But Pound also articulated a series
of other organizational difficulties, including a multiplicity of state courts, concurrent
federal jurisdiction, and varying state procedures. See Pound, Causes of Popular Dissat-
isfaction, supra note 2, at 409-13, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 284-88 (1964). Many of
these criticisms remain valid today. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-60 (1990)
(discussing presumption in favor of concurrent federal jurisdiction); John B. Oakley,
A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2003) (discussing varia-
tions among rules of procedure in state courts).
On the independence of the judiciary, in 1913 Pound and others established the
American Judicature Society in order to foster greaterjudicial independence and pur-
sue other judicial reforms. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 723 (1995); American Judicature
Society, About Us, http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs-about.asp (last visted Dec. 14, 2005)
(describing as the mission of the American Judicature Society "to secure and promote
an independent and qualified judiciary and fair system of justice"). See generally JuDI-
CIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B.
Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (discussing judicial independence and profes-
sionalism from interdisciplinary perspectives).
45 In later work Pound argued that the causes of the deficiencies of American
procedure were six: the development of procedural rules during medieval times when
keeping the peace by resolving disputes was more important than getting the result
right; the excessive formalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the
system matured; Puritanical jealousy of and desire to severely constrain the judicial
personality; America's frontier spirit; the bar's distrust of judicial power; and the eco-
nomic and professional incentives of lawyers to align with their clients' interests
rather than the interest in administering justice. Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note
4, at 395-99.
46 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 412, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 287 (1964); Pound, Decadence, supra note 6, at 26-27, 35.
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errors during trial that had little to do with the substance of the jury's
verdict-was "the worst feature of American procedure."47 Likewise,
excessive attention to missteps on points of how to preserve or take an
appeal-"the mere etiquette of justice"4S-wasted judicial time and
avoided decisions on the merits.
The most trenchant, memorable, and enduring criticism in
Pound's speech, however, was a two-paragraph attack on America's
"exaggerated '49 "common law contentious procedure." 50 Famously
describing it as the "sporting theory of justice,"5' Pound thought that
the American adversarial system excessively emphasized the procedu-
ral "rules of the game."5 2 A judge was "a mere umpire"53 whose job
was to enforce the rules and decide the points raised by lawyers; the
judge was not allowed to "search independently for truth and jus-
tice." 54 Lawyers forgot their roles as officers of the court, and strained
to find winning procedural advantages rather than trying to "dispose
of the controversy finally and upon its merits."55 Witnesses were
savaged in cross-examination, regardless of whether they were telling
the truth. Parties claimed "vested rights in errors of procedure."5 6 In
short,
47 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 413, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 288 (1964). Surveys by Pound found that between twenty-nine percent
and forty percent of all reported appellate cases in the early 1900s were decided on
procedural grounds. Id. at 413-14 (reporting twenty-nine percent and forty percent
in two different surveys), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 288 (1964); Pound, Principles (Part
I), supra note 4, at 392 (reporting thirty-five percent in another survey).
48 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 408, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 282 (1964); see id. at 414 ("[T]ime is frittered away on mere points of legal
etiquette."), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 289 (1964).
49 Id. at 406, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 282 (1964).
50 Id. at 404, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964). Although it is the most well
known portion in Pound's speech, his criticism of the adversarial system occupied less
than ten percent of his talk. Pound repeated the phrase "sporting theory of justice"
in later work, see Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4, at 399, and also referred to
the adversarial system as a system of "untrammeled advocacy," id. at 398.
51 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 404, 417, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 281, 291 (1964). Pound attributed the phrase to Wigmore. Id. at 404,
reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964).
52 Id. at 405, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964).
53 Id.; cf Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031 (1975) (criticizing the adversarial system's demand that the judge be a
passive umpire).
54 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 405, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 406, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 282 (1964).
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The inquiry is not, What do substantive law and justice require? In-
stead, the inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out
strictly? If any material infraction is discovered . . . our sporting
theory ofjustice awards new trials, or reverses judgments, or sustains
demurrers in the interest of regular play.5 7
The pernicious effect was to create a popular misapprehension of-
and dissatisfaction with-the purposes of law. Treating law as sport
led Americans, with their natural dislike of legal restraint, to try to
beat the game.58 Thus, rather than fostering respect for the law, the
courts "are made agents or abettors of lawlessness. '59
Pound's 1906 speech was long on critique and short on corrective
measures. 60 But the correction was not hard to see. The constant
theme of Pound's criticism of procedure was the system's failure to
arrive at the substantive merits of a case. The evident solution was to
design a procedural system whose sole commitment was resolving
cases on their merits. Then the conduit from socially just legislation
to the socially just determination of each case would be frictionless,
and the legal system would work (at least in theory) in perfect har-
mony. Popular satisfaction with the legal system would supplant
dissatisfaction.
Pound turned to specific corrective measures in later work. Some
of his proposed procedural agenda can be gleaned from his short
notes in the Illinois Law Review (which he co-edited); he occasionally
commented on a procedural development in this state or that court
which he thought propitious. 61 His most complete statement of posi-
tive measures for procedural measure came in 1910, in a two-part arti-
cle entitled Some Principles of Procedural Reform.62 Pound resisted any
attempt to draft specific rules; he recognized that an actual set of rules
had the inevitable tendency to become rigid and mechanical in opera-
57 Id.
58 Id. at 401-04, 406, reprinted in 35 F.F.D. 273, 278-81, 282 (1964).
59 Id. at 406, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 282 (1964); see Pound, Principles (Part I),
supra note 4, at 394 & n.15.
60 See Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 396 (stating that
"the first step must be diagnosis, and diagnosis will be the sole purpose of this pa-
per"), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 274 (1964).
61 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Editorial Note, Oral Instructions to Juries, 4 ILL. L. REV.
140 (1909); Roscoe Pound, Editorial Note, The Revision of the Code of Civil Procedure in
Kansas, 4 ILL. L. REV. 53 (1909).
62 Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4; Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedu-
ral Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 491 (1910) [hereinafter Pound, Principles (Part II)]. Pound
often recycled material in his articles, which were often based on speeches he gave to
different audiences. For a slightly modified version of these reform proposals, see
Pound, Practical Program, supra note 4.
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tion.63 Instead, between the two articles, Pound provided ten princi-
ples that he thought would make a set of procedural rules fairly
impervious to petrification. 6 4
Not surprisingly, the principles turned on two ideas: the resolu-
tion of cases on their substantive merits, and judicial discretion. The
first three principles set the tone:
I. It should be for the court, in its discretion, not the parties, to
vindicate rules of procedure intended solely to provide for the orderly dispatch
of business, saving of public time, and maintenance of the dignity of tribu-
nals; and such discretion should be reviewable only for abuse.
II. Except as they exist for the saving of public time and mainte-
nance of the dignity of tribunals,... rules of procedure should exist only to
secure to all parties a fair opportunity to meet the case against them and a
full pportunity to present their own case; and nothing should depend on or
be obtainable through them except the securing of such opportunity....
III. A practice act should deal only with the general features of proce-
dure and prescribe the general lines to be followed, leaving details to be fixed
by rules of court, which the courts may change from time to time as actual
experience of their application and operation dictates.65
Pound then sketched somewhat more specific principles that served as
much of the framing for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
related statutes: pleadings should give notice of the claims and de-
fenses, but no more;66 law and equity should be merged;67 broadjoin-
der that allowed the court to resolve all claims of all parties should be
63 Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4, at 388-89.
64 Pound never wrote a detailed set of procedural rules. Indeed, he was even
uncertain about the form that such rules should take-in particular, whether a code
should contain a relatively small number of rules (he mentioned one hundred as a
target) that were open-ended or a larger number of more precise rules (he men-
tioned two thousand as a possibility). See Pound, Practical Program, supra note 4, at
442; Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4, at 403, 407. He recognized that a legisla-
ture could enact the rules itself, but he argued that the best approach to reform
would be for a legislature to enact a broad and simple practice act, directing courts to
create their own rules. Pound, Practical Program, supra note 4, at 441-43; Pound, Prin-
ciples (Part I), supra note 4, at 403-07; Roscoe Pound, Reforming Procedure by Rules of
Court, 76 CENT. L.J. 211, 211-12 (1913); Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Procedure by Rules
of Court, 10 ILL. L. REv. 163, 169 (1915) [hereinafter Pound, Regulation].
65 Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4, at 402-03.
66 Pound, Principles (Part II), supra note 62, at 495-97; see FED. R. Cir. P. 8;
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (stating that Rule 8 requires
only notice pleading).
67 Pound, Principles (Part II), supra note 62, at 498-501; see FED. R. Crv. P. 2 (creat-
ing single type of claim, a "civil action").
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established; 68 a single trial should be held to resolve all issues;69 and
cases should be transferred to proper venues rather than dismissed in
an improper venue.70 The only major component of our present sys-
tem missing in Pound's litany is a process for discovering the facts. 71
Of course, the linchpin of Pound's principles-judicial discretion-
saturates the Federal Rules.72
Aside from deciding cases on their merits and imbuing trial
judges with discretion, a reform that naturally flowed from Pound's
1906 critique was abolition of the adversary system. Pound, however,
made no such suggestion. He harbored no illusions about how "the
yoke of commercialism '73 had perverted "the relation of attorney and
client" into "that of employer and employee. ' 74 Nor did he harbor
illusions about how a lawyer was likely to resolve the lawyer's conflict-
ing loyalties to client and court in light of the reality that the lawyer's
present and future compensation hinged on successful results for the
client. 75 Yet he wanted lawyers to become true officers of the court
68 Pound, Principles (Part II), supra note 62, at 501-03; see FED. R. CIv. P. 8(e) (2),
18-24 (allowing joinder of claims and defenses on a liberal basis).
69 Pound, Principles (Part II), supra note 62, at 494, 498-99. An implicit assump-
tion of the Federal Rules is a single culminating trial. Cf FED. R. CIv. P. 42(b) (au-
thorizing separate trials within the judge's discretion "in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and
economy").
70 Pound, Principles (Part II), supra note 62, at 497-98; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406,
1631 (2000). Today the achievement of this objective remains only partial. The stat-
utes cited above apply only in federal courts. Moreover, § 1406(a) permits dismissal
rather than transfer of claims filed in the wrong district or division.
71 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (providing methods for and limitations on fac-
tual discovery). Among Pound's principles were also some recommendations that
never caught on. They included a vigorous power of the judge to comment on the
evidence and arguments, as well as a power to require the jury to render conditional
verdicts on various hypothetical states of affairs, so that new trials could be avoided if
the appellate court disagreed with the factual findings of the jury. Pound, Principles
(Part II), supra note 62, at 503-05.
72 By Professor Subrin's count, judicial discretion is explicitly or implicitly pro-
vided for in twenty-eight of the eighty-four Federal Rules; the list includes many of the
most significant of these rules. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 923
n.76 (1987).
73 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 417, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 291 (1964).
74 Id. at 415, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 289 (1964); see also Pound, Principles (Part
I), supra note 4, at 399 (describing the "leaders of the American bars" as "client-care-
takers" whose "interest centers in an individual client or set of clients, not in the
general administration of justice").
75 Pound, Principles (Part I), supra note 4, at 399.
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with less allegiance to their clients' interests.76 He knew a great deal
about German jurisprudence and law77-indeed, his apparent sympa-
thy for Nazi Germany later led to his intellectual ostracization among
realists7 8-and German law presents the archetypical nonadversarial
system, with a powerful judge who possesses discretion to decide cases
on their merits, and with lawyers who see themselves as assistants in
the judicial process. 79 But Pound never argued for an abandonment
of the American adversarial system or the jury trial process so closely
aligned with it.8° He was, in the end, a traditionalist about the Anglo-
American adjudicatory method, a believer in the organic development
of the common law, and a former trial lawyer8 l-and all of these as-
pects of his personality seem to have blinded him to these evident
solutions to his own critique. He apparently believed, in his character-
istically optimistic way, that a procedural orientation toward merits-
based decisions, together with judicial discretion that policed sharp
procedural practices, would be sufficient to let lawyers' better natures
emerge.82
76 Id.
77 Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 403-05; Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,
supra note 5, at 606; Pound, Scope and Purpose (Part II), supra note 11, at 140-47. In
particular, Pound was aware of German procedure, which he described as "put[ting]
all initiative in the judge" who "in a sense conducts both sides of the cause." Pound,
Cardinal Principles, supra note 36, at 152. He placed this approach at the opposite of
the American "sporting theory ofjustice" in which "procedure takes away all initiative
from the judge and relies wholly upon counsel," and thought that his approach struck
a balance between the two. Id.
78 For a brief history of Pound's contacts with Nazi Germany and the realists'
negative reaction, see AMERiCAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 19, at 50, and Kyle Gra-
ham, The Refugee Jurist and American Law Schools 1933-1941, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 777,
789-90 (2002).
79 For classic accounts of Germanic inquisitorial justice, see Benjamin Kaplan et
al., Phases of German Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARv. L. REV. 1193, 1443 (1958);
and John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823
(1985).
80 Which is not to say that Pound enthusiastically supported jury trials. As a for-
mer trial lawyer himself, he well appreciated their limitations. He accepted juries
grudgingly, as an imperfect vehicle to assist in the individual tailoring of justice.
Pound, Enforcement, supra note 11, at 406; Pound, Justice (Part I), supra note 6, at 701;
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, supra note 23, at 18-19; Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 606. A reading of Pound's tepid defense suggests that
he might have been willing to abandon jury trials once judges began to apply the
insights of sociological jurisprudence.
81 See WIGDOR, supra note 3, at 209-10.
82 See id. at 209 (discussing Pound's "enthusias[m] for procedural reform, be-
cause it increased the creative capacity of the judiciary, and thus increased the profes-
sional character of a traditional institution designed to preserve an organic
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Many of the ideas on which Pound constructed his jurisprudence,
and consequently based his procedural reforms, remain contested to-
day. The first and broadest points of contention are Pound's views
that law serves socialjustice purposes, and that the litigation process
should be a frictionless conduit to achieve law's social objectives. The
nature of law is still debated;8 3 indeed, Pound's own views were not
entirely consistent.8 4 An argument over whether law was an organ of
social growth and progress, as opposed to a shield to provide security
for property rights against such social interference, was playing out
even as Pound spoke.8 5 Pound's ideas about law's foundations were
neither deep nor profound. Assuming that he correctly saw law's
function as the administration of social justice, 6 deep disagreement
about the demands of social justice existed in his time, and still exists
today. Thus far, social science has not been able to produce a consen-
sus about policy objectives or appropriate legislation. Will the judge
who uses her discretion as Derrida might counsel arrive at the same
result as the judge using his discretion to apply Skinner's insights?
How much bad social science-like "Herbert Spencer's Social Stat-
ics"8 7 -is out there? Progressive government by the best and the
brightest-especially in the 1910s, the 1930s, and the 1960s-has not
produced laws of incontestable merit. Those facts do not inherently
threaten Pound's procedural system, which is designed to make social
policy effective-whatever the policy might be. But the inability to
agree on the nature of law or the content of social justice creates the
risk that procedure will be the frictionless conduit of bad rather than
good legal arrangements; and, because frictionless procedure con-
connection among past, present, and future"); Pound, Cardinal Principles, supra note
36, at 152-53.
83 The available, and conflicting, jurisprudential justifications for law-such as
natural law, legal positivism, and morality-are much richer than they were in
Pound's day. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (linking
law and morality);JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) (arguing
for natural law); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (arguing for a positivist
account of law); see aISoJOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (creating theory of
justice for a pluralistic society).
84 Pound vacillated between an instrumental and an organic view of law. S~e
WIGDOR, supra note 3, at 207-32.
85 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
87 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Pound was aware of Holmes's derisive reference to Spencer, and even used it himself
to chide the Court's constitutional formalism. See Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,
supra note 5, at 616.
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tains no checks on bad policy choices, it might increase rather than
decrease dissatisfaction with the law.
That risk multiplies in the legal environment that began to take
shape fifty years after Pound spoke. The type of litigation with which
Pound was familiar-mostly retrospective application of legal princi-
ples in dyadic disputes affecting few parties or interests-has changed.
Today many cases are "public law litigation": prospective and quasi-
legislative in orientation, with vast social interests at stake and amor-
phous party allegiances. 88 Adjudication in these cases does not simply
transmit broad social-justice principles to individuals; it often creates
the principles themselves. Malleable procedural rules with a heavy
dose of judicial discretion place even more power in the hands of the
judge.89 The capacity of the judge to exercise such broad power
wisely, well, and with respect for democratic and federalist principles
is much debated.90
Nor is there agreement about the role of litigation in relation to
substantive law-whether it serves primarily a private dispute-resolving
function, or whether it is, as Pound had wanted it, an occasion for
88 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 ILRv. L. Rv.
1281 (1976); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015 (2004). In a rough sense, we can date
the movement toward public law litigation to 1954. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954). Pound's own law practice and brief tenure as a commissioner (in
essence, a temporary appellate judge) usually involved discrete, dyadic disputes. See
WIGDOR, supra note 3, at 69-71, 87-99. So did the examples he cited to prove the
failure of judicial administration. See Pound, Principles (Part II), supra note 62, at
492-94, 500-01. Of course, public law litigation existed well before Brown, and
Pound seemed to have low regard for the use of courts to resolve such controversies.
See Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 407 (noting that "the con-
stitutionality of the Missouri Compromise [was] tried in an action of trespass" and
"the power of the federal government to carry on the Civil War [was] tried judicially
in admiralty"; stating that these questions "are largely matters of economics, politics
and sociology upon which a democracy is peculiarly sensitive" and that "[t]he strain
put upon judicial institutions by such litigation is obviously very great"), reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 282-83 (1964). The differences between Pound's time and today are the
extent of such litigation and the enormous remedial power judges exercise. See
Chayes, supra.
89 See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of
Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1265-66 (arguing that discretionary procedu-
ral rules helped to lay the groundwork for public law litigation).
90 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353,
393-404 (1978) (contending that "polycentric" disputes cannot be adjudicated); Paul
J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WAsH. & LEE L. Rjv. 949, 949 (1978)
(expressing federalism concerns); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 662 (1978) (expressing separation-of-
powers concerns).
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society to declare and enforce its norms.91 Comparative analysis sug-
gests a reason to doubt that Pound's more ambitious role for proce-
dure fits the American character. 92 Nor, in many eyes, does it fit the
needs of modern litigation, with its emphasis on efficient dispute reso-
lution. 93 Recent assertions that judges should only be dispute-resolv-
ing umpires, with no overt social agenda to advance, seem to have
been favorably received, 94 but are antithetical to Pound's views.
More broadly, Pound's view suggests limited independent value
in procedural rules. As Justice Frankfurter famously observed, how-
ever, "[t]he history of liberty has largely been the history of obser-
vance of procedural safeguards. '95 Procedural rules serve, most
certainly, as a conduit to determine the merits of a controversy. But
they also serve many other functions that check, rather than act as a
perfect conduit for, the realization of substantive government pol-
icy;96 and their regular observance provides legitimacy to the judiciary
91 Compare Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2668-71 (1995) (sug-
gesting numerous advantages of alternative dispute resolution), with Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087-90 (1984) (arguing that because adjudica-
tion serves important social functions, private settlements often should not be en-
couraged), and Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 8 (2004) (arguing that dispute resolution paradigm weakens clarity and force
of legal rules).
92 See generally MIRJAN DAmASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY
(1986) (suggesting that nations with different attitudes toward the organization of
authority and the regulation of human behavior have different procedural norms).
93 See infra notes 201, 244-45 and accompanying text.
94 In his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. received wide-
spread publicity for his remarks that " j ]udges are not politicians who can promise to
do certain things in exchange for votes" and that "judges are like umpires. Umpires
don't make the rules; they apply them." See Charles Babington & Jo Becker, "Judges
Are Not Politicians," Roberts Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at Al.
95 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943); see also Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) ("Man being what he is cannot safely be trusted with complete immunity from
outward responsibility in depriving others of their rights.... The validity and moral
authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by which it was reached.... No
better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeop-
ardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has
a better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular govern-
ment, that justice has been done.").
96 For some of these functions, see John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Pro-
cess Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657 (1994); Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making
Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887
(1999); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil
Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893; Jerry L. Mashaw,
The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
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and the government as a whole. It is hardly clear that judges imbued
with discretion and constrained by no checks other than reaching the
merits of a controversy will always create greater satisfaction with the
administration of the law.
Second, and relatedly, Pound's approach blithely ignores the po-
litical implications of procedural choices. One of the appeals of
Pound's view is the apparent neutrality of his "on the merits" princi-
ple; value determinations are left to the substantive law, of which the
judge is a disinterested but enthusiastic expositor. Because it takes no
sides on the outcomes of specific disputes, Pound's procedural system
seems to be one on which partisans can agree. 97 But the claim of
neutrality is a chimera. Differing case management practices, in
which judges are given wide (indeed, Pound-like) discretion to choose
procedures to manage litigation, can deliver widely different expected
outcomes. 98 In the joinder context, studies have shown that different
joinder schemes can also result in dramatically different expected out-
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976); Frank
I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right To Protect One's
Rights-Part I, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153.
97 Cf Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 19 (1959) (arguing thatjudges should engage in constitutional adjudication
through the use of principles "that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved"). See generally Fuller, supra note 90 (describing
the ideal of a disinterested judge).
98 For example, different management techniques can result in markedly differ-
ent outcomes in an alleged mass exposure of nearby residents to a release from a
chemical plant. In Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2000), the
district judge issued a "Lone Pine order" to 1600 plaintiffs, thus requiring them to
provide individualized evidence, at the outset of the case, about their exposure to
defendants' chemicals and their medical diagnoses, as well as an expert's opinion
linking the two. When plaintiffs failed to produce sufficiently particularized affidavits,
the district court dismissed all 1600 claims. Although no provision of Rule 16 specifi-
cally authorizes Lone Pine orders, the court of appeals held that such orders were
within the district court's general case management powers, and upheld the dismissal
on abuse-of-discretion review. In contrast, comparable toxic-chemical exposure cases,
using different case management techniques that did not focus on proof of plaintiffs'
injuries at the outset, have resulted in multimillion dollar settlements. See In re Com-
bustion, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. La. 1997) (approving plan allocating more than
$20 million in settlement proceeds to 10,000 neighborhood residents, who were for
the first time providing information about exposure and medical diagnosis); see also
Francis E. McGovern & E. Allen Lind, The Discovery Survey, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1988, at 41 (discussing the case management technique of an informal pre-
trial survey to obtain exposure and medical information on 10,000 nearby residents;
the case eventually settled for $15 million, after the dismissal of more than 3000 plain-
tiffs for their failure to complete the survey).
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comes, in terms of both the merits and the remedy;99 other data con-
firm that result with other procedural choices. 0 0 Contrary to Pound's
rose-colored view,' 10 there is no such thing as a baseline "neutral pro-
cedure."'10 2 Put differently, in a world with omniscient judges, there is
no need of procedure; but, in a world without omniscient judges, "on
the merits" resolutions do not exist independently of the procedures
used to obtain the result. The procedures used help to define what
the merits are; "on the merits" has no meaning or significance apart
from a given procedural system. The decision between competing
procedural rules is often a decision between competing outcomes-
between the groups we choose to favor and those we do not. There-
fore,judicial discretion carries the inherent risk that individual judges
will shape procedural rules to achieve desired outcomes. Procedure is
not devoid of politics. 10 3
99 See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plain-
itff Population Size, and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated CivilJury Decisions, 12 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 209 (1988).
100 See, e.g., Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation
of Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269 (1990) (reporting
changed effects on liability and damages outcomes in bifurcated trials); Samual Is-
sacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE
L.J. 73 (1990) (discussing changes in expected litigation outcome from varying sum-
maryjudgment standards); Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Sav-
ing:A StatisticalAnalysis, 76 HARv. L. REv. 1606 (1963) (finding rise in defense verdicts
when issue of liability was bifurcated and tried before damages).
101 Pound apparently believed that changes in procedural law would have no sig-
nificant effect on substantive law: "Change in the substantive law, involving interfer-
ence with the security of individual interests and impairing the social interest in the
general security, must proceed slowly and cautiously. No such interference or impair-
ment is involved in changes of details of procedure today .... " Pound, Regulation,
supra note 64, at 167.
102 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1472-73
(1987) (book review) [hereinafter Burbank, Complexity]; Stephen B. Burbank, Proce-
dure, Politics, and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1677, 1706-07
(2004) [hereinafter Burbank, Procedure].
103 This reality is graphically summarized in the observation of Representative
John Dingell: "I'll let you write the substance ... and you let me write the procedure,
and I'll screw you every time." Regulatory Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 2327 Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. Dingell). This insight has not
been lost on many politicians. On a number of occasions in recent years, Congress
has changed procedural requirements in the hope of affecting substantive outcomes.
See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (changing jurisdictional and settlement rules
for federal class actions); Y2K Act, Pub. L. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-6617 (2000)) (imposing notification and heightened
pleading requirements in Y2K liability lawsuits); Private Securities Litigation Reform
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Third, and again relatedly, Pound oversold the ability of his pro-
cedural principles to control American adversarial culture. If differ-
ent procedural contours can indeed shape different expected
outcomes, then discretionary procedure will heighten the attention
that adversaries will pay to procedural choices, not lessen it. Indeed,
discretionary procedure creates a new level of gamesmanship-argu-
ing not only over questions of compliance with procedural rules but
also over the very rules to apply. Three-quarters of a century into
Pound's experiment, concerns for excessive adversarialism have not
abated, and complaints about "the sporting theory of justice" echo
through the decades into the present.10 4 As the economics of the le-
gal profession have continued to evolve in ways that Pound could not
have imagined, incentives for sharp practices have increased. 0 5 So
Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 8u-4) (changing aspects of the federal class action rules in federal securities cases).
See generally Burbank, Procedure, supra note 102, at 1699-703 (describing recent con-
gressional efforts to create "statutory procedural law").
104 See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. Riv. 1295 (1979); Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial
Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversaria4
90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005); Langbein, supra note 79; Edward D. Re, The Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 Si. JOHN'S L. REv. 85 (1994); Wil-
liam W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U.
PrrIT. L. REv. 703 (1989).
105 For instance, one court sanctioned a law firm for pressing obviously perjured
testimony from a client whose lack of candor had already caused a prior firm to with-
draw. In the course of justifying the Rule 11 sanction, the court noted:
The Court is familiar enough with large law firm practice in New York
to know that this is a typical large law firm situation in which a client is
introduced to the firm by one partner but the litigation is handled by an-
other. The Court is also aware of the substantial economic benefits that flow
to "finders", the partners who find the clients, and the pressure to please the
client that is felt by the "minders", the lawyers that actually do the client's
work. Thus, the litigating partner in this case no doubt felt an obligation to
his partners not to jeopardize the firm's relationship with the client by tell-
ing the client that the client's factual statements were not credible in light of
all of the contrary evidence .... Given the economic pressures of big firm
practice, it is the responsibility of the firm to insure [sic] that each of its
partners is aware that it is firm policy that its partners and associates adhere
to the highest ethical standards and that if a lawyer's adherence to those
standards results in the loss of a client, large or small, the lawyer will not
suffer any adverse consequence.
Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 10175 JSM), 2002 WL 59434, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 16, 2002), vacated sub nom. In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86
(2d Cir. 2003) (overturning the sanction due to a lack of bad faith by the law firm).
Sadly, this situation was not the only occasion on which the pressures of modern liti-
gation forced the court to consider sanctions against the law firm's behavior.
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has the concern for such practices, as numerous changes in the Fed-
eral Rules show.1 0 6 Of course, excessive adversarialism is not an issue
in all, or even most, cases;' 0 7 but it is unlikely that it was so in Pound's
time either. And the solution we have sought to apply to the "prob-
lem cases" is Pound-like: we give district judges more power and au-
thority over litigation. As we do so, however, we sometimes
miscalculate how the new powers create even more incentives for
sharp practices, 08 and even more opportunities for the creation of
novel, ad hoc procedural practices that can shift expected outcomes
in litigation.
Whatever the merits of such powers, however, they tinker only at
the margins. Our procedural system remains firmly in the hands of
See Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10175 (JSM), 2001 WL
1154669, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2001) (sanctioning a lawyer for filing a meritless
motion that the lawyer filed "in order to prove to his client how tough he could be"),
affd, 317 F.3d 209, 222 (2d Cir. 2003) (mentioning the lawyer's slightly amended
justification that he had brought the meritless motion "to apply pressure on Plaintiff
to produce [certain discovery] after the discovery deadline had passed"). Nor is the
situation described in this litigation unique. See Note, Collective Sanctions and Large
Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336 (2005). See generally PatrickJ. Schiltz, On
Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profes-
sion, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 924 (1999) (describing the large-law-firm culture).
106 For instance, among other matters, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1983 imposed new obligations on lawyers not to pursue frivolous claims
or defenses, gave judges expansive new case management powers under Rules 16 and
26(f)-(g), and provided additional opportunities (presently codified in Rule
26(b) (2)) for judges to curtail disproportional discovery. In 1993, Rule 11 was modi-
fied to curtail some of the sharp practices that the 1983 amendment had engendered,
the list of case management powers in Rule 16 was expanded and the discovery con-
ference requirement of Rule 26(f) strengthened, mandatory disclosure (presently
codified in Rule 26(a)) became an optional method to avoid some costs of discovery,
and the number and duration of depositions, as well as lawyers' behavior in deposi-
tions, were limited in Rule 30(a)(2), (d)(1), and (d)(2). In 2000, further amend-
ments precluded federal districts from opting out of mandatory disclosures of Rule
26(a), and cut back on discoverable information in Rule 26(b) (1). See infra notes
294-96 and accompanying text.
107 SeeJames S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Jack B. Weinstein, What
Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear's The Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 649 (1989); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclo-
sure Practices Under the 1993 Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998).
108 The classic example is the saga of Rule 11, which was toughened in 1983 to
deter frivolous litigation but which became a favorite tactical weapon to intimidate an
opponent during the ensuing ten years. Amendments in 1993, especially Rule Il's
safe harbor provision and its softening of sanctions, attempted to save the core of
Rule 11 while counteracting its excessive use. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (c) (1) (A), (c) (2);
FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993 amend.).
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lawyers in its day-to-day operation, and judges cannot exercise control
of legal practice at the level of specificity needed to change the client-
comes-first culture of American adversarialism. The years lived under
the Federal Rules suggest that Learned Hand's assessment of human
nature and the adversarial process sounds a truer note than Pound's
optimism:
The truth is that no rules in the end will help us. We shall succeed
in making our results conform with our professions only by a
change of heart in ourselves. ... But not, I fear, short of something
like that; we are made all of a piece, and the cloven hoof will show
however well the bestial heart be covered. 10 9
This fact does not mean that we should necessarily abandon the adver-
sarial system. 1 10 But it means that we have reason-in particular, sev-
enty-five years worth of accumulated experience Pound did not
possess-to question Pound's assumptions about how easily his pre-
scription would cure America's love for sporting justice.
Finally, Pound's solution undervalued the side effects of a highly
discretionary procedural system: lack of procedural uniformity (ex-
cept at a high level of generality), I I delay, expense, and uncertainty.
Pound recognized that some of these costs were inevitable in a legal
system based on an equitable approach, 1 2 but never suggested ways to
avoid them. Our experience under the Federal Rules shows that the
anticipated consequences of an equitable code have for the most part
played out.' 1' Most of the significant amendments to the Federal
Rules since 1980, as well as numerous statutory developments in the
same era, have been designed as antidotes for the Federal Rules' equi-
109 Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials To Reach the Heart of the Matter, in LEC-
TURES ON LEGAL Topics 1921-1922, at 87, 104 (1926).
110 For further discussion of this point, see infra Parts II.C, III.C.
111 See Burbank, Complexity, supra note 102, at 1474. But see David L. Shapiro, Fed-
eral Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969,
1975 (1989) (arguing that discretion and the consequent disuniformity are not neces-
sarily undesirable). Ironically, Pound had thought disuniformity in procedure was
one of the problems in American procedure. See Pound, Causes of PopularDissatisfac-
tion, supra note 2, at 413, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 287 (1964). Pound never ad-
dressed the evident counterargument that a discretionary procedural code in a real
sense lessens rather than increases uniformity, because each case or type of case re-
ceives tailored procedures. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discre-
tion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1561 (2003) (developing typology ofjudicial discretion).
112 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
113 Subrin, supra note 72, at 922-25, 974; see also Kessler, supra note 104, at
1251-60 (arguing that the present difficulties developed from the effort to incorpo-
rate inquisitorial equitable procedures into the adversarial model).
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table side effects.1 14 But these antidotes again work principally at the
margins and leave discretion as the baseline. Indeed, in order to rem-
edy problems of cost and delay, many of the significant recent devel-
opments have expanded the judicial discretion that lies at the very
heart of cost and delay. Side effects like disuniformity, cost, and delay
do not necessarily mean that an "on the merits," discretionary system
is not worth its price, but their existence does mean that the system's
price is greater than Pound's own work would have had us believe-
and perhaps great enough to abolish or significantly temper his
approach. 115
Even if these conceptual problems do not refute Pound's proce-
dural vision, they raise a serious question about whether we should
maintain a procedural system built on the sinking sands of Pound's
foundation. One argument for the status quo, which Pound would
surely have despised, is that, even if the procedural system was based
on doubtful or flawed assumptions, it has now been set into motion,
and must be allowed to mechanically roll forward in order not to un-
settle present expectations. I think another argument is better. It lies
in the aphorism that sums up Pound's system: "on the merits." Pithy
and self-evident, the principle of deciding cases "on the merits" seems
an irrefutable truth. ("You mean, Lester, you want to set up a proce-
dural system that doesn't resolve cases on their merits?") At the mar-
gins, of course, the principle can be opposed; if every case can be
resolved perfectly on the merits, but at a cost of $10 million apiece, we
might need to look for a much cheaper system that performs nearly as
well. 1 16 But the notion that we would set up rules that are not geared
to getting it right most of the time seems unimaginable in an affluent
modern society. With the painful experience of rigid common law
114 For a discussion of some of the changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, see supra note 106. For two statutory changes trying to address the expense and
delay endemic to equitable procedure in an adversarial culture, see Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2000)); Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658).
115 Cf. ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCE-
DURE princs. 9.2, 11.3 (Am. Law Inst. & UNIDROIT 2004) (requiring pleadings to
identify a party's "principal evidence" and to state "in reasonable detail" the facts and
the law supporting their position in model rules for transnational commercial dis-
putes); id. princs. 16.1, 16.4 (permitting discovery of relevant, nonprivileged informa-
tion, but only allowing the customs of the forum to determine how discovery is to be
conducted).
116 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALVSIS OF LAW § 21.1 (6th ed. 2003); Law-
rence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 244-59 (2004) (analyzing
accuracy-cost tradeoff in terms of political philosophy).
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procedure seared into our collective legal conscience, and with the
flexibility and profusion of our modern substantive laws, it is also diffi-
cult to see how we can achieve merits-based decisions without a con-
siderable amount of judicial discretion. Whether the adversarial
system helps or hinders "on the merits" decisions remains an open
debate,1 7 but the lack of a clearly better alternative and our historical
familiarity make the adversarial process palatable. And so we keep
that which we know.
Other considerations weigh in to maintain the system. Pound ad-
vocated uniformity in procedure among different jurisdictions; 18
and, due to the way that events played out, the Federal Rules proved
influential enough that rough uniformity, at least at the level of for-
mal rule, has been achieved. 119 Moreover, the system, while hardly
simple, is far more comprehensible and less technical than the com-
117 Compare STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 33-39 (1988) (arguing for adversary system), with Fran-
kel, supra note 53, at 1035-36 (arguing that adversary system distorts search for
truth), and Langbein, supra note 79, at 833-34 (arguing that adversary collection of
evidence hinders truth-seeking).
118 Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, at 409-13, reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 284-88 (1964). Followers of Pound realized the difficulty of achieving
such uniformity at the state level. Hence, they focused on creating a federal system of
rules that might serve as a model for state reform. As one of the leading proponents
of the Rules Enabling Act stated:
[T] he conceded failure of state conformity called for a substitute. The Fed-
eral government could not follow the States, so it was reasonable to give the
states an opportunity to follow the Federal government. That state which
tries to live unto itself will stiffer, if it does not perish.... [A] simple, scien-
tific, correlated system of rules, such as would be prepared and promulgated
by the Supreme Court of the United States, would prove a model that would,
for reasons of convenience as well as of principle, be adopted by the states.
Thomas Wall Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 23 CASE & COMMENT 388, 393
(1916).
119 I do not mean to suggest that the states have a single, uniform procedural
code. State procedural variation is wide, and apparently increasing. John B. Oakley
& Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REX,. 1367 (1986); Oakley, supra note 44; cf Thomas 0. Main,
Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in
Three States that Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REx,. 311
(2001) (discussing the effect of local legal culture on interpretations of the Federal
Rules and related state rules). For the most part, however, the variations lie at the
edges; the basic process-relatively liberal pleading and joinder, pretrial discovery
and management, single (often jury) trial-is roughly comparable in all states. Of
course, a highly discretionary code is more uniform in its literal language than in its
application in real cases, in which differing discretionary choices can lead to widely
disparate rules on the ground. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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mon law and code pleading regimes it supplanted. Pound's reform
movement took hold at a unique time in American life, when the clar-
ion call of progress led us to believe that the social scientific lawyer
could create an-indeed, the-optimal procedural system. Given our
heightened sensitivity to the politics of procedural choices, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that we could achieve anything as uniform and simple
as the Federal Rules if we tried again today. So the "on the merits,"
discretionary, and adversarial system of Pound's design is still the one
we employ-whatever the validity of the jurisprudential commitments
and beliefs undergirding it. Pound's evocative jurisprudence has
faded from memory, but the tangible residue of its procedural system
remains.
II. OUR CENTURY
Pound's 1906 speech invites us to consider the causes of popular
dissatisfaction with the administration of civil justice at the start of our
century. To a limited extent, the present challenges and pressures are
the same as they were when Pound spoke, but to a greater extent, they
are different in kind and order of magnitude. And our procedural
system today is no more ready to face these challenges and pressures
than the system of Pound's time was able to face its own.
A. Competitive Pressures
Competitive pressures create the most pressing concerns for the
American litigation system. Competition comes from two principal
sources: globalization and the rise of alternative methods of dispute
resolution. Together these sources continue to marginalize the Amer-
ican litigation system, which has been slow to respond but which, if it
is to remain viable, must adjust to counter the challenges these
sources pose.
Globalization takes one of Pound's concerns to a heightened
level. Pound abhorred disuniformity in procedure-but he was talk-
ing about disuniformity among states whose procedural systems bore a
family resemblance to each other.120 Today, transnational commer-
cial ventures bring into contact procedural regimes that differ at the
foundational level. Understandably, parties to transnational agree-
ments feel most comfortable with their own procedures and courts,
and distrust the procedures and courts of other parties. Four re-
sponses to this discomfort are possible: (1) a "take it or leave it" ap-
proach, in which the party with superior bargaining position forces
120 See supra note 119.
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the inferior party to accede to the superior party's legal system; (2) an
"I'lljust walk away" approach, in which parties of rough equality fail to
come to terms because of unbridgeable differences in preferred
processes for dispute resolution; (3) a "we'll hope for the best" ap-
proach, in which the parties fail to resolve transnational dispute reso-
lution issues in the hope that resort to litigation will be unnecessary;
or (4) a "vote with our feet" approach, in which the parties opt out of
the litigation system of both nations, and agree to arbitrate the dis-
pute privately-often with negotiated procedural norms (or at least
with contractual provisions for determining such norms).121 The first
approach does nothing to lessen the dissatisfaction of the inferior
party toward the superior party's adjudicatory system; but, except in
cases of extreme bargaining disparity, is likely to hurt the superior
party's ability to obtain as a favorable deal on other terms of the con-
tract. Similarly, the second and third approaches do not lessen dissat-
isfaction, and the second approach threatens to prevent otherwise
productive transnational deals. The final approach, which is used to-
day with great frequency, 122 keeps both procedural systems fully func-
tioning within their respective spheres, but makes these systems less
relevant than the arbitration processes that replace them. If the par-
ties are opting into an arbitration process that they prefer to the adju-
dicatory process, then a strong argument can be made that the defect
lies in the adjudicatory process, which should be reformed in order to
reflect the "law in action."1 23
121 For instance, in international arbitrations, a common approach is not to spec-
ify the norms directly, but to allow the chosen arbitrator to determine the procedures
that apply to the case. In such cases, a series of procedural norms for international
arbitration have emerged to guide arbitrators, including the widely used United Na-
tions Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules.
Under one view, the overall effect of allowing arbitrators to select procedural norms
has been the development of a set of arbitration rules "which progressively rise[s] to
the level of a standard arbitration procedure" and which "has the invaluable merit of
merging different procedural cultures." Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of
Arbitral Procedure, 36 VIND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1322-23 (2003). For a somewhat
more cautionary tale, see Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the
Lessons of ADl, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 449 (2005).
122 ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE,
introductory cmt., at 3 (Am. Law Inst. & UNIDROIT 2004) (Cambridge Univ. Press
2006). The practice of including an arbitration clause in a transnational contract is so
pervasive that I have been informed by some practitioners and scholars in the field of
international business transactions that the failure to negotiate for such a clause is
tantamount to legal malpractice.
123 The idea of reforming law (especially commercial law) to correspond to indi-
viduals' ordinary or customary behavior, which is sometimes referred to as "law in
action," is usually associated with Karl Llewellyn, the legal realist with whom Pound
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These concerns have special importance in the context of Ameri-
can procedure. Global dissatisfaction with the American procedural
system is well known. 124 On numerous fronts, American procedure is
exceptional, standing far outside the mainstream of procedural re-
gimes. The first set of differences concerns the basic rules for process-
ing lawsuits. On pleadings, a number of systems demand great
specificity; the American system of "notice pleading" is among the
most liberal in the world. 125 Rules of joinder vary; most famously,
class actions are almost entirely a common law phenomenon, 126 and
nowhere are they employed with anything approaching the enthusi-
asm that Americans have shown for class action litigation. 127 In many
countries, especially within the civilian tradition, the "trial" is essen-
tially a series of hearings that eventually produces a final judgment;
others, including the United States, follow the common law method
of a single, culminating trial. 128 Perhaps the most significant aspect of
remained on good terms. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The
Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 435 n.3 (1930). Llewellyn credited Pound with
coining the "law in action" phrase. Id.; see also Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action,
supra note 23, at 34-35.
124 See, e.g., ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE, reporters' preface, at xxvii (Am. Law Inst. & UNIDROIT 2004) (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2006) (noting particular dissatisfaction with American-style discovery and
the American right to jury trial); Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are
We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 299 (2002).
125 See ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCE-
DURE R. 12.3-12.4, 13.4; id. R. 12 cmt. R-12A. Among the systems generally noted for
requiring great specificity in pleadings is the German system, on which Rules 12.3 and
13.4 are based. See Thomas Karst, Federal Republic of Germany, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE 239, 242-43 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed., 2003); see also OUTLINE OF CIVIL LITI
GATION IN JAPAN 6, 10 (Sup. Ct. Japan 2002) (describing specificity ofJapanese plead-
ings); Govand Asokan & Juanita Low, Singapore, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE,
supra, at 605, 610-11 (describing specificity required in pleadings submitted in Singa-
pore courts).
126 See RACHEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 5 (2004). A few civil law systems, such as Quebec, Brazil,
and China, have in recent years adopted class action procedures. Id.; Antonio Gidi,
Class Actions in Brazil-A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. Comp. L. 311, 381
(2003); Note, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523 (1998). For a
description of somewhat comparable protections extended to groups in some civil law
systems, see Gidi, supra, at 313 n.1.
127 See MULHERON, supra note 126, at 9 (calling the United States the "home of the
class action"). American enthusiasm for class actions is not monolithic. State rules
differ somewhat among themselves, and with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, con-
cerning the details of class action practice. See SECTION OF LITIG., ABA, SURVEY OF
STATE CLASS ACTION LAw-2005 (Anne P. Wheeler et al. eds., 2005).
128 For a description of Germany's discontinuous-trial method, see Langbein,
supra note 79, at 826-32. The differences should not be overstated. Increasingly,
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American exceptionalism, however, involves pretrial discovery. While
many systems provide for limited forms of discovery, none approaches
the breadth of American inquiry into the facts. Much of the world is
on record as opposing American-style discovery. 129
A second form of Arherican exceptionalism involves the distribu-
tion of adjudicatory functions in a manner that varies substantially
from that of other systems. At a functional level, an adjudicatory sys-
tem must allocate responsibility for numerous roles, including the de-
velopment and presentation of claims, evidence, and arguments, the
determination of the law, and the determination of the facts.'130 In
terms of developing and presenting claims and evidence, the United
States and other common law counties use an adversarial approach.
This model places lawyers in charge of the critical adjudicatory tasks
of constructing claims and defenses, gathering evidence, and present-
ing the client's legal and factual case. The adversarial system's main
competitor, the inquisitorial model of the civilian tradition, places the
judge in charge of these tasks; the lawyer's role is to suggest lines of
German and other civil law countries are moving toward the common law's concen-
trated-trial approach. See ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CF\1L PROCEDURE R. 29 cmt. R-29A (recommending general adoption of concen-
trated-trial approach); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First
Instance Civil Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules,
63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 609, 614-15 (1988). On the other side, the Federal Rules also
allow for separating the trial into parts, at least when separation would be convenient
and would not upset jury trial rights. See FED. R. Crv. P. 42(b); Gasoline Prods. Co. v.
Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
129 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdic-
tions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1998); Subrin, supra note 124. Indeed,
Article 23 of the Hague Convention allows a signatory country to "declare that it will
not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery
of documents as known in Common Law countries." Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 1970, art. 23, 23 U.S.T.
2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (1994 & Supp. 2005). Most of
the present signatories (including some common law countries with discovery rights
less generous than the United States) have declared in their ratifications a reservation
forbidding or limiting common law discovery under this convention. See JAY
TIDMARSii & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
1164 (1998). For an overview of other nations' discovery procedures, which range
from non-existent to limited, see INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 125;
TRIAL AND COURT PROCEDURES WORLDWIDE (Charles Platto ed., 1991).
130 A fuller description of adjudicatory tasks would include presentation of claims
and defenses, issue definition, evidence gathering, marshaling of evidence and argu-
ments, determination of law and fact, application of fact to law, declaring appropriate
remedies, and ensuring compliance with those remedies. The tasks highlighted in
the text are those over which different jurisdictions most frequently disagree in their
allocation.
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inquiry and to facilitate the court's demands for information.131 Al-
though pure versions of neither model exist in the world,132 many
countries adopt an inquisitorial approach to civil justice, and others
the adversarial. 13 3 In yet another example of American exceptional-
ism, the United States places itself far into the adversarial camp at the
level of procedural rule, and even farther as a matter of practice.134
In terms of the law-determining function, judges perform this
task across all legal systems,135 but that consensus conceals more than
it reveals. Nations whose histories, political institutions, social struc-
tures, and experiences with judicial independence vary widely also dif-
fer, not surprisingly, about the meaning of law and the rule of law,
about the proper sources of law, and about the judge's competence to
create law.136 The common law judge's power to declare and tailor
law is a point of American pride, but an institutional horror to coun-
tries with traditions or experiences of despotic rule and limited judi-
cial independence. 13 7  Similarly, the distribution of judicial
authority-from France's judicial hierarchy and limited attitude to-
ward judicial review138 to the broad diffusion of power among trial
131 Hazard, supra note 129, at 1019-20.
132 See THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 2-3 (2004).
133 See INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 125; Langbein, supra note 79.
134 See Rowe ET AL., supra note 132, at 3, 27-28. A common perception among
foreign lawyers is to see the American legal system as extreme. Cf Gidi, supra note
126, at 322 (discussing concerns in the Brazilian system about importing the "Yankee
package," or "American-style litigation"). Of course, foreign concerns over American-
style litigation extend beyond the use of an aggressive client-focused adversarial ap-
proach, and include such matters as discovery, jury trial, attorneys' fees, the size of
American damage awards, and the perceived litigiousness of the American popula-
tion. In particular, issues concerning attorneys' fees-such as the "American rule"
that prevents fee-shifting to the losing party, the broad availability of contingency fees,
and the use of multipliers in some fee awards-create a unique set of incentives that
distinguish the American adversarial system.
135 Cf Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979) (upholding
delegation of adjudicatory authority to a special master, but declining to award com-
pensation to a law professor who served as a legal advisor to the master).
136 See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 192-210,
671-99 (1994).
137 See Hazard, supra note 129, at 1025-28 (explaining that the infusion of Ameri-
can-style discovery can appear to "civil law jurists in the French tradition ... as fore-
shadowing a restoration of the Bourbons"); F.L. Morton, Judicial Activism in France, in
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991) (de-
tailing French aversion to judicial review and judicial activism). See generallyJuDICAL
ACTIVISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra (describing reluctant attitudes of many
legal systems toward a more activist judiciary).
138 France's courts of appeal are entitled to determine de novo all factual and
legal issues brought before them; and, although the matter is beginning to change
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courts in the United States (a diffusion powerfully aided by the jury
system and by Pound's reforms that increased procedural discre-
tion) 139-creates differing forms of judicial structure in practice.
Finally, in terms of factfinding, most procedural systems rely on
judges; in many common law countries, juries also find occasional
use. 140 In another instance of American exceptionalism, however, no
country uses juries as widely as the United States, whose federal and
state courts are constitutionally compelled to employ juries in a wide
array of cases. 141 The power of the American jury is not limited just to
finding facts; juries are typically asked to perform the all-important
task of applying the law to the facts as well. 142 Along with discovery,
jury trial is a principal reason that other countries react with visceral
negativity toward the American legal system. 143 Yet jury trial is in-
with respect to constitutional questions, all French courts have traditionally taken a
very limited view of their ability to strike down legislative or executive action or to
create new legal principles. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 136, at 77-85, 190-206;
Morton, supra note 137. See generally DAMASKA, supra note 92, at 36 (locating origins
of hierarchical ordering of the French judiciary in the French Revolution).
139 See infra notes 140-45, 171-78 and accompanying text.
140 See generally WORLD JURY SYSTEMS (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000) (surveying uses of
civil and criminal juries in various nations and finding that juries, although available
in numerous countries' criminaljustice systems, are either unavailable or rarely availa-
ble in civil cases).
141 The federal right to a civil jury can be conferred by statute, see FED. R. Civ. P.
39(a), but is generally contained in the Seventh Amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend.
VII. Because it "preserve[s]" the English right to ajury trial, which extended in 1791
only to common law cases, the Seventh Amendment does not require juries to deter-
mine the facts in all civil cases. In a thumbnail, juries are required only in private-
rights cases when historical practice and the monetary nature of the relief sought
combine to make a claim appear more "legal" than "equitable" in nature. Even then,
a judge can determine certain facts within the claim in some circumstances. See
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). American states are not yet bound to follow the Sev-
enth Amendment, see Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 169 n.4 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the Seventh Amendment is one of the few remaining provi-
sions in the Bill of Rights which has not been held to be applicable to the States"), but
most states provide comparable if not greater protection to the jury trial right, see
Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 655 & n.2
(1963).
142 The jury's function of applying the law to the facts can be taken away or highly
regulated. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 49(a) (limiting jury to finding facts through the tech-
nique of the special verdict); FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (providing a check over the appli-
cation function through the technique of a general verdict accompanied by answers
to interrogatories). In practice, however, these techniques are infrequently employed.
143 ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIV1L PROCEDURE,
reporters' preface, at xxvii (Am. Law Inst. & UNIDROIT 2004) (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2006).
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grained in the American psyche, and also in American procedural
rules.
Indeed, the architecture of the American procedural system is de-
termined largely by two variables: the expectation ofjury trial and the
unsatisfactory results of our history of common law pleading. In par-
ticular, jury trial affects our entire system of legal procedure. Juries
cannot be reconstituted easily, and the Constitution limits the power
of a second jury to re-examine the factual findings of the first.144
Therefore, a strong presumption lies in favor of a concentrated, all-
issues trial. That presumption in turn requires that all development
of legal or factual issues be concentrated in a pretrial phase. In order
to prevent unfair surprise at trial, while still assuring that pleading
tricks and traps do not thwart "on the merits" decisions, the pretrial
process therefore must be designed to allow significant development
of factual and legal issues. More generally, juries check judicial
power-a preference that adversarial process further helps to but-
tress. 145 It is no exaggeration to say that the jury looms over every-
thing procedural, and that the jury's existence makes compromise
between the American and other procedural systems difficult to
achieve.
Spanning procedural disagreements over discovery, the adver-
sarial system, andjury trial will be no easy feat. Many of the variations
in procedural rules sprouted from the political, economic, and cul-
tural forces at work in particular regions and countries in particular
historical times. These variations create deeply embedded social ex-
pectations; we would be unhappy to wake up tomorrow to find the
Chinese or French procedural system in full force in the United
States, and citizens of China and France would not likely be any hap-
pier waking up to our system. Mirjan Damaska has argued persua-
sively that the different types of political states and the distribution (or
centralization) of authority determine fundamental procedural forms
and rules. 146 A logical corollary is that efforts to bridge procedural
144 U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-ex-
amined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law."); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
145 See Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Common Law Jury,
in WoRLD JURY SYSTEMS, supra note 140, at 1, 7-18 (exploring the political theory
underlying jury trial and noting the relationship between the adversarial system and
jury trial).
146 DAmavAsKA, supra note 92, at 181-239. Professor Reitz has suggested a simpler
metric: that major "architectural" features of a country's laws and legal system can be
derived from the notion of "political economy." John C. Reitz, Political Economy as a
Major Architectural Principle of Public Law, 75 TUL. L. REv. 1121 (2001).
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differences are unlikely to yield satisfactory results until countries first
bridge the political and social differences that create or reinforce pro-
cedural variations. Transnational agreement on procedural norms
might be possible only in subcultures whose shared values transcend
national boundaries; thus, it is not surprising that transnational corpo-
rations that agree on market solutions and that value certainty, exper-
tise, and efficiency choose to contract for arbitrated dispute resolution
processes. 147
Pressure for "leveling out" in procedure is likely to increase as
regional and international "federations," "communities," "unions," or
"trade zones" become commonplace. Clinging to exceptionalism
threatens to isolate the legal regime of the United States at a time
when isolation is not the smart bet. Strong arguments support each
item of American exceptionalism; in important ways, discovery, class
actions, a strong adversarial system, and jury trials are all helpful to
the effective workings of an American-style democracy, economy, and
culture. But fondness cannot substitute for clarity of thought, nor can
nostalgia blind us to the trend line. If American rulemakers believe,
as I do, that it important not to desert the United States on a remote
island, they must begin to build bridges toward other procedural sys-
tems. To do so, we must develop a clear understanding of the proce-
dural pieces we must preserve, the pieces on which we should
compromise, and the pieces we must jettison-and we must do so
now, before events on the global stage overtake our system.
Surely, an objection might run, transnational litigation is, and is
likely to remain, only a small part of the workload of American courts.
Even in a more globalized world, transnational pressures on our pro-
cedural system can be contained; "federations" or "communities" of
countries can function only with a high degree of cosmopolitanism,
which will need to tolerate "local choice" on a wide variety of matters,
including a country's choice of procedural system. 148 Perhaps. But
that objection misses an equally significant point: the American proce-
147 Cf Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1335
(2003) (suggesting that economic factors have created a culture of transnational
arbitration).
148 The cosmopolitan movement hypothesizes a world with a loose, ill defined,
and somewhat messy "federated" structure, in which overlapping authorities deal with
comparable issues until, perhaps at some distant point, shared values and methods
trump regional differences. On cosmopolitanism generally, see GLOBAL TRANSFORMA-
TIONS: POLITICs, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE (David Held et al. eds., 1999); DAVID HELD,
DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER (1995); David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideas, Reali-
ties and Deficits, in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds.,
2002).
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dural system is facing competitive pressures on the domestic front at
least as great as those likely to emerge on the international front.
Americans are avoiding the litigation system in unprecedented num-
bers, either choosing not to resolve disputes at all or relying on pre-
litigation alternative forms of dispute resolution such as arbitration,
mediation, settlement, and other hybrid processes. 149 Even when a
plaintiff selects litigation as the dispute resolution mechanism, the
lawsuit frequently serves only as an entry point into another ADR solu-
tion. Courts sponsor-and often require litigant participation in-
one or more forms of ADR, 150 which appear on balance to lead to no
worse results, in terms of cost, delay, and participant satisfaction, than
litigated solutions.' 51 In most cases, discovery is useful more for devel-
oping information needed to negotiate an alternative end to the case
than for avoiding unfair surprise at trial. 152 According to the most
recent statistics, only 1.6% of all filed civil cases reach trial.153 Of
course, these last statistics are misleading, because litigated outcomes
-i.e., outcomes that result in "on the merits" judgments, including
149 See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1183-89 (1992) (summariz-
ing statistical evidence showing that less than twenty percent of injured parties seek
any redress, and, depending on the nature of the claim, only two percent to eleven
percent file civil cases due to their injuries). On methods of dispute resolution that
are effective alternatives to litigation, see generally LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E.
WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 2-6 (abr. 2d ed. 1998).
150 See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat.
2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000)); FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(9). See generally
Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 609-22 (2005)
(describing various legislative and judicial efforts to promote ADR).
151 SeeJAMEs S. KAKALIK, AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALU-
ATION UNDER THE CIVILJUSTICE REFORM ACT 4 (1996); see also id. at 9-13 (describing
inconclusive findings in prior studies). But see Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not
True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002J. DIsP. RESOL. 81, 85-95 (detailing empirical
evidence suggesting that litigants prefer adversarial adjudication to court-annexed
mediation).
152 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discov-
ery, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 435, 435-36 (1994) (describing different possible uses of discov-
ery); Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Civil Litigation with Mandatory Discovery and
Voluntary Transmission of Private Information, 34J. LEGAL STUD. 137 (2005) (describing
circumstances under which mandatory discovery can increase the likelihood of settle-
ment). In some cases, the threat of discovery itself becomes a settlement tool. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1989).
153 LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSI-
NESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR app., at
159-61 tbl.C-4A (2004) [hereinafter REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2004/appendices/c4a.pdf. The full report is available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/library/dirrpt04/2004AnnualReportFull.pdf.
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judgments based on motions to dismiss, motions for summary judg-
ment, dismissals as a sanction for violating a court order, and trials-
constitute one-fifth of all case dispositions.1 54 The critical statistic,
however, is that four-fifths of the claims that enter the litigation system
exit through nonlitigation processes-principally settlements, arbitra-
tions, and voluntary dismissal of claims.1 5 5
Despite this reality, our procedural system is structured around
the belief that a case will be resolved at a culminating, all-issues jury
trial. A fair question is to ask whether the entire procedural system
should be designed around that most rare occurrence, the vanishing
jury trial. 156 If form follows function, a procedural system designed to
develop the types of information useful to settlement or summary dis-
position, and to structure the litigation process in stages most condu-
cive to settlement or summary disposition, is more logical. 15 7 Put
differently, in Pound's opinion, the specific procedural evil of very
greatest consequence was the "lavish" granting of new trials. 158 It was
154 According to one study of more than 1,600 federal and state cases, approxi-
mately two-thirds of all civil cases settled, and another fifteen percent ended in "arbi-
tration, decisions, or dismissal for cause." Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to
Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163 (1986). The remaining cases
are adjudicated, although most are dismissed on pretrial motion rather than after
trial. Id. at 162-64.
155 Id.; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1339-40, 1387 (1994) (describing
the Kritzer study and analyzing factors likely to cause even greater movement toward
settlement in the future).
156 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462-63 tbl.1 (2004) (report-
ing that, of the 1.8% of all federal cases that reached trial in 2002, two-thirds (or 1.2%
of all cases) were jury trials) [hereinafter Galanter, Vanishing Trial]; see also Thomas
H. Cohen, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 2002-2003, BuREAu JUST. STAT. BULL., Aug.
2005, at 2-3 (reporting an eighty percent decline, from 3,600 to 800 per year, in
federal tort trials between 1985 and 2003); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of
Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1256 (2005) (describing "a long-
term and gradual decline in the portion of cases that terminate in trial and a steep
drop in the absolute number of trials" during recent years) [hereinafter Galanter,
Thirty Years War]. For a discussion on the limits of using such data, see Stephen B.
Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference in Search-
ing for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 571 (2004).
157 See Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727 (2005).
158 See supra notes 47, 57 and accompanying text. In some sense, Pound was a
victim of his own method. He relied on regional reporters to determine the greatest
procedural deficiencies, finding that new trial motions predominated in reported ap-
pellate decisions. Reported appellate decisions constitute a skewed sample from
which to make judgments about the overall health of the procedural system. George
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largely as an antidote to this evil that he advocated for a highly discre-
tionary procedural system. I doubt one lawyer in one hundred would
claim that the lavish granting of new trials is the greatest problem in
today's procedural system. 159 Perhaps that fact proves the validity of
Pound's discretionary, "on the merits" approach; we have fairly well
cured the nation of excessive new trials. Or perhaps we should ques-
tion the factual foundation of Pound's vision, and therefore the effi-
cacy of his cure. In either event, we need to be realistic that the cure
has caused other diseases, such as cost, delay, disuniformity in applica-
tion of procedural rules, perceived variability in outcomes, and the
attendant dissatisfaction with our procedural system. Those concerns
erect barriers to entering the litigation system and then induce those
who enter the system to exit.
In a procedural world attuned to resolutions other than trial, the
identification of sticking points and of each party's needs and con-
cerns, and the tailored development of information to address these
matters, would take center stage. 160 Pleadings might need to be
fuller, and discovery narrower in its early stages. The critical question
of "relevance"-i.e., "relevant to what?"-will switch from "relevant to
the claims or defenses of any party"161 to "relevant to early, inexpen-
sive, and amicable disposition of the case." Surgically targeted deter-
mination of legal and factual issues might replace the "meat cleaver"
approach of summary judgment.162 Negotiation skills rather than liti-
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
1-3 (1984). Indeed, evidence exists that, even in days much closer to Pound's than
ours and before Pound's reforms took effect, trials were not common occurrences.
See Galanter, Thirty Years War, supra note 156, at 1257-59 (describing trial rates in
various jurisdictions before and after the turn of the twentieth century; virtually all the
trial rates were significantly less than fifty percent with anywhere from two-thirds to
seven-eighths of filed cases not being tried). In any event, given the rarity of the
modern trial, lavish and unwarranted grants of new trials under Pound's definition
might conceivably affect only a tiny percentage of modern cases.
159 Commentaries on potential causes of dissatisfaction with the procedural system
do not mention the excessive frequency of new trials as a principal weakness of the
American litigation system. See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL (1989).
160 See Moffitt, supra note 157; cf Hensler, supra note 151, at 96-97 (suggesting
ways in which trial procedures might influence court-annexed ADR).
161 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (1) (allowing "discovery regarding any matter, not privi-
leged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party" and, on a showing of good
cause, additional "discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action").
162 In theory, summaryjudgment is available only when an entire claim or defense
can be resolved. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b). But see FED. R. Cirv. P. 56(d) (allowing
adjudication of specific facts when motion for summary judgment fails); cf Paul D.
Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the
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gation skills will be the desired commodity in lawyers, and a strict ad-
versarial ethic will be replaced by an ethic-still adversarial in its
way163-that seeks to find points of cooperation and agreement in or-
der to structure the best deal possible.
Of course, one argument for maintaining our present system is
that its broad access to information provides parties with the informa-
tion to make better assessments of their cases, thus fostering settle-
ment; another is that the expense and uncertainty of American
litigation and trial actually foster settlements by opening up a wider
settlement range. 164 Changes that streamline the litigation system
Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2095
(1989) (analyzing proposed changes in summary judgment rules to permit courts to
adjudicate factual disputes not materially in dispute even when their resolution will
not dispose of a claim or defense).
163 Negotiating lawyers still have as their primary loyalty the client's interests. In-
deed, in a world in which litigation is unlikely, that interest is likely to predominate,
perhaps even more than it does now, over the lawyer's conflicting loyalty as an officer
of the court. But negotiation is not always a zero-sum game in the way that litigation
is, and the best negotiators know that meeting the other party's critical needs are
central to a satisfactory deal. The ABA has recently suggested ethical guidelines for
negotiation. See SECrION OF LITIG., ABA, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NECO-
TIATIONS (2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/ethics/settle-
mentnegotiations.pdf; see also Brian C. Haussmann, Note, The ABA Ethical Guidelines
for Settlement Negotiations: Exceeding the Limits of the Adversarial Ethic, 89 CORNELL L.
REv. 1218 (2004).
164 For rational actors, settlements are a function of two variables: expected recov-
ery at trial and the costs of litigation. For instance, risk-neutral rational parties facing
a $100,000 expected judgment with a fifty percent chance of recovery and no litiga-
tion costs should settle the case for exactly $50,000. Any slight variation in the parties'
assessment (say, the defendant believes the case has only a forty percent chance of
success) will make settlement impossible, as the defendant will pay no more than
$40,000 and the plaintiff will take no less than $50,000. Once the uncertainties of
litigation and litigation costs enter the picture, however, settlement dynamics change.
Juries can introduce greater variability in the chances of success and in the size of the
likely judgment, see Horowitz & Bordens, supra note 99, and the expense of litigation
makes parties willing to expand their settlement range as well. For instance, assume
that the plaintiff and defendant assess the chances of winning as somewhere between
thirty-five percent and sixty-five percent, with a likely judgment somewhere between
$80,000 and $120,000, and that each side will incur $10,000 in litigation costs. A
rational plaintiff is willing to take anything more than $18,000 ([.35 x $80,000] -
$10,000) and defendant will pay as much as $88,000 ([.65 x $120,000] + $10,000). In
theory, any settlement in this range is good for both parties. Of course, a wide settle-
ment range also creates inducements to engage in strategic bargaining behavior, thus
reducing the likelihood of settlement. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 135-41 (3d ed. 2003) (analyzing the factors that
enter into the decision to settle); POSNER, supra note 116, § 21.4 (quantifying such
factors).
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narrow the settlement range and make settlements less likely. But
these criticisms miss the mark. Pressed to their limit, they argue for
an exorbitantly expensive procedural system in which alternate dis-
pute resolution is almost always preferable. Given that the status quo
entering litigation is an actual or threatened loss borne by the victim,
such expensive procedural systems in effect create a policy bias in
favor of injurers' actions and against victims' needs for redress. Fur-
thermore, the ways in which ADR might make the civil justice system
change would not necessarily make litigation less costly; the point
would be to change litigation procedures in a way that makes nonliti-
gated solutions easier to achieve. Such solutions (for instance, staging
early information exchanges to obtain only the information useful for
settlement1 65) might actually increase the costliness of going to trial,
and thus increase settlement ranges.166
Like the visions of the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, changes
signaled by transnational and ADR pressures are not "the shadows of
the things that Will be," but "the shadows of things that May be,
only."'167 Technology might improve to the point that disputes will be
resolved quickly, cheaply, and accurately. 168 If technology can truly
do so, perhaps procedural systems around the world will embrace it
and uniformity will result. But this optimism is unfounded for the
present time. In any event, the same technological advances are also
likely to make non-adjudicatory resolutions quicker, cheaper, and
better.
Judged by the number of transnational and domestic parties that,
before or after entry, ultimately opt out of the American litigation sys-
tem, dissatisfaction with the American procedural system runs high.
Our present system responds poorly to the emerging needs of the
transnational order. Domestic litigants desire quicker, cheaper, and
better resolutions. The American trial system is increasingly marginal-
ized. Procedural changes of the type that might really matter face
constitutional, political, and cultural obstacles. And these pressures
are only the first level of concern with our system. There are others.
165 See, e.g., Klein v. King, 132 F.R.D. 525, 529 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
166 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 155, at 1362 (exploring the effect of transac-
tion costs on the likelihood of settlement).
167 CHARLEs DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 93 (Octopus Books 1980) (1843).
168 See Paul D. Carrington, Virtual Civil Litigation: A Visit to John Bunyan's Celestial
City, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (1998). On the other hand, unavoidable risks of techno-
logical advance are that technology might unacceptably increase the disparity be-
tween haves and have-nots and that its slickness can mislead unsophisticated
factfinders. See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 129, at 1338-47.
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B. Accountability in Rulemaking
As with competitive pressures, issues of accountability involve two
strands. The first question of accountability is the tremendous de
facto power wielded by the district judge-the anti-democratic under-
belly of Pound's discretion. The second is the question of political
influence over the rulemaking process. Although they appear to be
rather different concerns, they derive from the common reality that
procedural choices are inherently and intensely political. 169 They in-
tertwine to pose a second set of concerns for the direction of the
American procedural system.
To understand the interrelationship between these concerns,
consider a 2 x 2 matrix containing two sets of variables relevant to the
administration of procedural rules. The first set of variables concerns
the two likeliest institutions in a modern democracy for making proce-
dural rules: the legislature or the judiciary. 170 The second set of vari-
ables concerns the nature of the rules that are made: whether they
permit the judge administering the case to exercise little or considera-
ble discretion. The following matrix represents the possible
combinations:
Rulemaker
Legislature Judiciary
Little (1) Centralized (2) Mix of delegation
ite democratic control of and control; less
S Discretion ajdcto
adjudication democratic
; - Considerable (3) Mix of delegation (4) Decentralized; less
~and control; more
Discretion dc more democraticdemocratic
Each box represents a particular possible attitude toward adjudi-
cation. Boxes (1) and (2) involve situations with hierarchical and cen-
169 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
170 The rulemaker could be the legislature or court itself, or it could be a commit-
tee or council established by the legislature or judiciary to promulgate the rules itself.
The federal model is a hybrid solution. An advisory committee initially drafts recom-
mended rules, and then passes the recommendations through a series of additional
committees to the Supreme Court. The Court itself then promulgates the rules, but
the rules do not become effective until Congress has had at least six months to con-
sider them and enact legislation blocking their use in court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a),
2073(a)-(b), 2074 (2000). Federal trial and appellate courts also have an opportunity
to promulgate rules for their own courts, as long as they are consistent with the Fed-
eral Rules. Id. §§ 2071, 2077.
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tralized control over the adjudicatory process (and, to the extent that
procedure can influence outcomes, over adjudicatory results); boxes
(3) and (4) represent the exercise of more diffused procedural au-
thority. Conversely, boxes (1) and (3) involve more democratic con-
trol over the adjudicatory process (and, again, over the adjudicatory
results of individual cases). Boxes (2) and (4) involve more insulation
of adjudicatory results from direct democratic control, at least when
the judiciary or the committee creating the rules is not elected.
In boxes (1) and (4), the tendencies tend to be self-reinforcing.
In box (1), a system of limited delegation of judicial discretion rein-
forces the effort to maintain democratic control over the adjudicatory
process. Conversely, in box (4), the devolution of discretionary proce-
dural authority to trial judges reinforces the decentralizing delegation
of rulemaking authority to the judiciary. Boxes (2) and (3), in con-
trast, keep the centralizing tendencies in procedural rulemaking and
the extent of democratic influence over individual adjudication in
tension with each other.
Locating a particular procedural system within one of these four
approaches does not tell us very much about what the precise con-
tours of a system's rules will be. Because the approaches are ideal
models, nothing precludes an actual procedural system from contain-
ing elements of all four approaches. Nor do the models determine
exactly how little or how much discretion judges should have. But the
matrix does surface a critical question facing our system today: how
much should the adjudicatory process (and the results it generates)
be responsive to democratic control and the attainment of legislative,
as opposed to judicial, policy objectives?
Seemingly unaware of the political dimensions of rulemaking (in
both the systemic and the case-by-case senses), Pound saw no tension
between a system of highly discretionary rules created by courts171 and
a robust democracy. Indeed, he thought that the move from box (2),
in which American procedure was ensconced in the early twentieth
century, to box (4), in which his own reform proposals were located,
would bolster democracy; judges could better enforce the legislative
will by having the discretion to tailor procedures in a way that
achieved decisions on the substance, which was increasingly defined
by legislation. 172 He opposed the move to either box (1) or box (3),
171 Pound believed that the legislature should set only the broad outlines of proce-
dure through a practice act that delegated responsibility for creating the rules to the
court; he rejected the idea that the legislature could do the job as well or as quickly.
He also thought that the rules themselves should provide considerable discretion to
the judge on the ground. See supra note 64.
172 See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
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mostly because he doubted that the legislature could act quickly
enough but also because he doubted a legislature's ability to make
rules that were flexible enough to resist the inevitable tendency to
formalism and to achieve merits-based decisions. 17 3
We have adopted Pound's vision. Of course, some of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure contain centralized directions from the Su-
preme Court (i.e., box (2)),174 Congress is experimenting increasingly
with detailed legislative control over procedural rules (i.e., box
(1)),175 and Congress has occasionally enacted loose, discretionary
procedural standards (i.e., box (3)).176 For the most part, however,
our system delegates rulemaking authority to the judiciary,1 77 and the
rules then devolve considerable rulemaking power to the local
judge.178 As vast as the extent of this delegation to the local level ap-
pears on paper, it is even greater in reality. The justice meted out in
the trial courts is the only justice that more than eighty-seven percent
of litigants ever receive. As discussed above, four-fifths of all cases end
in the district court after settlement, arbitration, or voluntary dismis-
sal; 179 among the remaining one-fifth that result in a judgment, less
than two-thirds reach the appellate stage.' 80 Even of the roughly thir-
173 See Pound, Practical Program, supra note 4, at 441-43; Pound, Principles (Part I),
supra note 4, at 403-07.
174 For instance, the rules of pleading allow for no deviation from the norm, al-
though they do involve considerable discretion in applying their open-textured provi-
sions. See FED. R. Clv. P. 8-9; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)
(holding that complaints filed under Title VII do not require "greater particularity"
than "the ordinary rules" for pleading). Likewise, rules of mandatory disclosure and
discovery usually operate within routine forms, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1)-26(a) (3),
26(a) (5), 30-35, but even here, virtually every detail of the rules is subject to change if
necessary, see FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(6), 26(f), 29.
175 See supra note 103.
176 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(E) (2000) (authorizing intervention of right
on same discretionary terms as provided for in Rule 24(a)).
177 See supra note 170. Congress has constrained judicial rulemaking in various
ways. The principal limitation is the Rules Enabling Act's requirement that procedu-
ral rules not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
(2000). Although this limitation seems to constrain rulemaking with overtly substan-
tive preferences, the Supreme Court has held that Federal Rules with only "incidental
effects" on substantive rights do not run afoul of§ 2072(a). Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chro-
matic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 553 (1991); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 465 (1965). But see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997)
(suggesting that § 2072(a)'s limitation should caution courts away from an expansive
interpretation of Rule 23).
178 See Shapiro, supra note 111, at 1975-78; supra note 72 and accompanying text.
179 See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
180 The number is an extrapolation from data available at the federal level. In the
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2004, 252,761 cases were disposed of by
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teen percent cases that are appealed, sixty-one percent are terminated
for procedural reasons without reaching the merits.18' Of the cases
that reach the merits on appeal (about eight percent of all claims filed
in the district court), the structure of appellate review-deferring to
trial judges on findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous"18 2
and on matters of discretion in the absence of abuse 1 8 3-results in
only 11.1% being reversed and 3.0% being remanded.' 8 4 Therefore,
the district courts. REPORT, supra note 153, app., at 126-28 tbl.C, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/C.pdf. Assuming that the eighty percent
figure for nonmerits determinations holds true, see supra text accompanying note 179,
50,552 cases would have been decided on their merits during this period. In the same
period, 33,075 cases were appealed from the district courts to the courts of appeal
(exclusive of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). REPORT,
supra note 153, app., at 94-96 tbl.B-3A, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2004/appendices/b3a.pdf. Dividing this number by the approximated merits-
based decisions yields an appeal rate of 65.4% of cases decided on their merits. Obvi-
ously, some of the appeals decided before September 30, 2004 were taken from cases
decided before October 1, 2003, and some of the district court dispositions as of Sep-
tember 30, 2004, had not been appealed by that date. Therefore, these statistics pro-
vide only an approximate indication of the exact percentage of appeals taken.
Using an older but larger data set, Professor Eisenberg reported an appeal rate of
10.9% in all federal civil cases filed between 1987 and 1996. See Theodore Eisenberg,
Appeal Rates in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Outcomes, 1J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 663, 664 tbl.1 (2004).
181 The numbers are derived from the most recent data available for the federal
courts. REPORT, supra note 153, app., at 100-03 tbl.B-5, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b5.pdf; see also id. app. at 104-07 tbl. B-
5A, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b5a.pdf (breaking
down nonmerits dismissals by type). Total dispositions of civil appeals (derived by
adding together the numbers for U.S. prisoner petitions, other U.S. civil cases, private
prisoner petitions, and other private civil cases) are 32,174. Total dispositions of civil
appeals on their merits (derived by adding together the numbers for U.S. prisoner
petitions, other U.S. civil cases, private prisoner petitions, and other private civil
cases) are 12,494. Figures for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit are not included in these numbers. See id.
182 FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a); see United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948). Comparable protection for the factual findings of juries exists; neither the
trial judge nor an appellate court can overturn a jury's verdict unless "there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party" on an
issue and "a claim or defense ... cannot under the controlling law be maintained or
defeated without a favorable finding on that issue." FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (1); see
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
183 "Abuse of discretion" is the appellate standard applied to review discretionary
decisions of a lower court. See RowE ET AL., supra note 132, at 301; cf. Will v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 666 (1978) (suggesting that an abuse of discretion occurs
only when a judge decides against a "clear and indisputable" right).
184 The numbers are derived from the most recent data available for the federal
courts. REPORT, supra note 153, app., at 100-03 tbl.B-5, available at http://
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the chance of staying in the game long enough to obtain on appeal an
adjudicated "on the merits" decision different than the one a district
court would dispense is about one percent.1 85 Although it is interest-
ing to concentrate on the work of the appellate and supreme courts,
gazing at the tip of the pyramid ignores the enormous real-world
power being wielded beneath them.
In many ways, the devolution of authority from central
rulemakers to a dispersed magistracy makes sense in a system struc-
tured as we have structured ours. The American litigation system is
among the most decentralized in the world. It spreads the adjudica-
tory functions of law-declaration among local trial courts, regional ap-
pellate courts, and central supreme courts. It places primary
responsibility for the factfinding function at the trial level, subject
only to limited review at higher levels;' 86 and in a significant number
of cases, it leaves the factfinding to a group of temporary citizen-adju-
dicators, the jury. It further decentralizes procedural power by plac-
ing important tasks such as claim selection, issue definition, evidence
gathering, and evidence presentation in the hands of the parties and
their lawyers. It also disperses authority through systems of coordi-
nate state and federal courts with overlapping jurisdiction, and pro-
vides only limited opportunities for definitive determinations by the
highest relevant judicial authority. 18 7  Devolution of significant
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b5.pdf. Total dispositions on the merits
of civil appeals (derived by adding together the numbers for U.S. prisoner petitions,
other U.S. civil cases, private prisoner petitions, and other private civil cases) are
12,494. Id. Total reversals (adding the same columns) are 1,390. Id. Total remands
(adding the same columns) are 372. Id. Figures for the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit are not included in these numbers. See id.
185 Because the calculations in the text hinge on an extrapolation, see supra note
180 and accompanying text, the one percent figure is an estimate. But it accords with
available data for earlier time periods. See Eisenberg, supra note 180, at 664 tbl.1
(reporting a comparable 1.3% reversal rate in federal civil cases decided between
1987 and 1996).
186 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
187 The United States Supreme Court's docket is almost entirely discretionary, see
28 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1254, 1257 (2000), and the Supreme Court has in recent years
granted review in about one percent of the cases in its discretionary docket, see Rowe
ET AL., supra note 132, at 21. Many state supreme courts maintain a similar discretion-
ary docket. Moreover, although many states permit certification of legal questions to
their supreme court, it is rarely invoked. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 44, at 1200-02;
id. at 1202 n.8 (noting informal survey that found only twenty-four certifications from
federal to state court in 2001). But see Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 76-78 (1997) (requiring certification of novel state law questions in a federal
constitutional claim). Most diversity cases and cases decided in a court of a state
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rulemaking authority to the local level (i.e., the "box 4" paradigm) is
consonant with this non-hierarchical procedural approach. 88
On the other hand, as the recent upsurge in legislative control
over procedural questions shows, there are serious questions about
the sustainability of Pound's "box 4" paradigm. A predictable set of
costs is associated with judicial discretion: expense, delay, unpredict-
ability, and abuse of power. 189 Pound was aware of these costs a cen-
tury ago,190 and well before then, the criticisms of pre-Stuart English
equity practice, with its similar emphasis on discretion over rule, ran
in the same vein. 191 Less frequently mentioned is another cost: discre-
tionary rules can cause similar cases to be resolved differently under
different operative procedures. 9 2 As undesirable as this inequity
might be on its own merits, it also means that, in every case, the issue
of the procedures to be applied has the potential to become a con-
tested matter.193 Expense and delay are inevitable consequences-es-
pecially in an adversarial system in which the litigants naturally strive
to secure all possible advantages.1 94 Pound's discretionary approach
other than the state whose law applies likewise receive no definitive interpretation
from the relevant state supreme court.
188 See DmtVAsKA, supra note 92, at 214-22 (discussing procedural attributes of such
a decentralized approach in a laissez-faire state).
189 SeeJudith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 417-31 (1982); Sha-
piro, supra note 111, at 1978 (noting "the oft-expressed concern that the cause of
justice is not advanced by uncontrolled judicial power"); id. at 1995 ("Discretion can
be quite dangerous, however, when it is unbounded. Judges are human and humans
tend to abuse power when they have it ...."); Subrin, supra note 72, at 925. For a
modern classic analyzing the benefits and costs of judicial discretion, see AHARON
BARAK,JuDICIAL DISCRETION (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1987).
190 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
191 See 1 SIR WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 423-28
(1922). In the seventeenth century, with Bacon's nascent effort to regularize proce-
dural rules in 1618 and Nottingham's recognition of stare decisis in 1676, equity be-
came more rigid, operated like the common law (albeit with different procedures and
rules), and lost its discretionary roots. See id. at 428; TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra
note 129, at 38-47. Those discretionary roots, buried by more than two centuries of
legalism, were what Pound hoped to uncover. See Pound, Decadence, supra note 6.
192 Burbank, Complexity, supra note 102, at 1474 ("Many of the Federal Rules au-
thorize essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-substantive in only the
most trivial sense."); Shapiro, supra note 111, at 1978-79.
193 Of course, the procedural wheel is not reinvented in every case. But the Fed-
eral Rules invite lawyers and judges at least to consider whether it should be. See FED.
R. Crv. P. 16(c)(12), 26(f), 29. Even if the lawyers and court make no changes in the
default rules, considering the matter imposes significant costs.
194 Expense and delay are hardly unique to an adversarial system with considera-
ble judicial discretion. Expense and delay were issues in Pound's day, which primarily
used an adversarial approach with only limited judicial discretion. See supra notes
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did not curb the adversarial tendency toward gamesmanship, but
rather gave it new meat on which to feed.195
On this view, the additional discretion we have given to judges as
part of their case management authority is largely counterproductive.
Empirical data back up this intuition. Most case management powers
have little or no effect on the metrics of cost, delay, and participant
satisfaction. The savings or reductions in delay that case management
achieves in one case were often offset by increased expenses or
greater delays of additional customized procedures in another. t 96
One technique resulted in clear savings: early, firm deadlines. 197 But
the operative word is firm. In order for this technique to be effective,
deadlines need to be rigidly enforced-an insistence on technicality
that is the antithesis of a discretionary procedural system.
Customizing rules for each case also raises a concern of great sig-
nificance in a democratic society: the fear that judges will use their
discretionary power, consciously or subconsciously, to tailor rules in a
way that influences the outcome of individual litigation. 98 Given the
result-influencing nature of procedural rules, the trial judge's discre-
tion to tailor rules for individual cases is an inherently political
power-the case-by-case corollary of the choice reflected in the Rules
Enabling Act to delegate to the judiciary the political power to make
46-48 and accompanying text. They are also common complaints in inquisitorial sys-
tems with judicial discretion. See Manuel Barrocas, Europe: Summary, in ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF LITIGATION WORLDWIDE 137, 139-42 (Charles Platto ed., 1999);
Keith Steele & Belinda Bell, Asia Pacific: Summary, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
LITIGATION WORLDWIDE, supra, at 9, 13-18. My point is that the combination of adver-
sarialism and judicial discretion creates particular kinds of costs that other ap-
proaches would not.
195 A sufficient proof of the point is to scan professional trade magazines and the
proceedings of continuing legal education conferences, which are filled with lawyers'
articles asserting how this technique or that device can create an advantageous out-
come for certain classes of clients.
196 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVILJUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996); Kakalik et al., supra note 107. Accord-
ing to these studies, various case management techniques tended to reduce time to
disposition but then increase attorney hours. Only two techniques (early, firm trial
dates, which are considered infra note 197 and accompanying text, and early manage-
ment accompanied by discovery planning) resulted in reductions in time to disposi-
tion with no net increase in attorney hours. See also Galanter & Cahill, supra note 155,
at 1388 (stating that decisions to settle are largely independent of judicial efforts to
foster settlements).
197 KAFALIK ET AL., supra note 196, at 52-59. Savings in some cases are neutralized
by extra expense in others. One exception is early, firm trial date, but note that this
rigid approach is the opposite of discretion.
198 Fuller, supra note 90, at 381-87, 391; Resnik, supra note 189, at 424-31.
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rules. 199 The "box 4" paradigm imposes only limited checks on the
accountability of the trial judge. Not surprisingly, an important body
of literature is now exploring the tension between judicial indepen-
dence and democratic control that the delegation of procedural
rulemaking has created.20 0
A related concern with the "box 4" paradigm is the ease with
which nondemocratic shifts in political priorities can be accom-
plished. For Pound, the entire point of discretionary procedure was
to shake off excessive legal formalism, to bring law and justice into
accord, and-to use Pound's aphorism again-to decide cases "on
their merits." He hoped that this approach would have useful side
effects in terms of saving expense and shortening delay, but they were
not the goals per se. Beginning in the 1970s, discretion began to be
put to new purposes: to rein in adversarial practices, and to reduce
expense and delay. To some extent this new direction was not incon-
sistent with Pound's vision, but anyone who reads reported decisions
should be struck by how modern judicial discretion, harnessed to re-
ducing costs and delay, is remarkably un-Pound-like in spirit. Case
management has taken on a life of its own, and dismissals for failure
to abide by court-imposed scheduling deadlines, issue-narrowing re-
quirements, and final pretrial orders fill the reporters. 20 1 Many cases
are determined on the criteria of efficiency and obedience to judicial
will rather than on their merits.
To some degree, this shift in the uses to which discretion has
been put has resulted from legislative action, 20 2 but to a larger extent
legislation has merely jumped on a train already engineered by
judges, lawyers, and academics who were less politically accountable
and who had become convinced that thoroughgoing "on the merits"
decisionmaking created too many delays and cost too much money. 20 3
199 See Burbank, Complexity, supra note 102, at 1469-76.
200 Professor Burbank has recently written an excellent article, itself an important
contribution to the literature, that contains citations to other works. Burbank, Proce-
dure, supra note 102.
201 See, e.g., Tower Ventures, Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 47-48 (1st Cir.
2002) (upholding dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with a district court's
scheduling order); Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2000)
(upholding dismissal for failure to comply with pre-discovery orders requiring expert
affidavits); R.M.R. v. Muskogee County Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 812, 818-19 (l1th Cir.
1999) (upholding exclusion of a witness not listed in a pretrial order).
202 See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000)).
203 The beginning of the movement might be dated to 1976, when Chief Justice
Burger's keynote address to the Pound Conference, convened to mark the seventieth
anniversary of Pound's speech, took aim at the excesses of the modern adversarial
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I do not claim that this shift lacked transparency; it was well docu-
mented in copious Advisory Committee notes. Nor will I claim here
that the shift was unwise, even though the empirical data raise ques-
tions about whether the game has been worth the candle.20 4 The
point is that judges so easily converted Pound's animating procedural
vision into something quite distinct. This fact tells a cautionary tale
about the degree to which a procedural system in a democracy re-
quires overt political oversight and accountability.
Therefore, a critical challenge in the delivery of civil justice is de-
termining the proper degree of political control and accountability-
both for the creation of the civil rules and for the judge's administra-
tion of those rules in individual cases. 20 5 The shift into a "box 4" pro-
cedural paradigm has imposed costs that lie at the heart of present
dissatisfaction with the civil system, but it has also created a procedu-
ral system far more satisfying than its predecessors. Likewise, in Amer-
ican democracy, the lack of judicial accountability to popular will is
problematic, but judicial independence is a treasured ideal. In bal-
ancing these concerns, some of us might legitimately believe that insti-
tutional competency and judicial independence should permit judges
system. See Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Keynote Address Delivered at the Na-
tional Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice: Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation (Apr. 7, 1976), in
70 F.R.D. 83 (1976), and reprinted in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUS-
TICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (Leo Levin & Russell Wheeler eds., 1979). Others at the con-
ference echoed his concerns. See Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While
You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1155, 1156-58 (1993) (noting the influ-
ence of this address). By the late 1970s, numerous calls for reform of civil procedure
had begun to emerge, and the drumbeat continued throughout the next decade. See,
e.g., Am. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES AFFECTING
COMPLEX LITIGATION (1981) (echoing the recommendations of the Pound confer-
ence), reprinted in 90 F.R.D. 207 (1981); THE BROOKINGS INST., supra note 159; NAT'L
COMM. FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST AWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT AND THE ArroRNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
ANTITRUST LAws AND PROCEDURES (1979) (making numerous recommendations for
improving enforcement of antitrus:, targeting, among other areas, judicial manage-
ment and control, use of time limits, and control of discovery), reprinted in 80 F.R.D.
509 (1979); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770 (1981) (arguing that effec-
tive pretrial management by judges helped increase judicial productivity); Schwarzer,
supra note 104 (arguing that the increased scope and complexity of civil litigation
undermined the original goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and required
active case management by judges).
204 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
205 Cf Burbank, Complexity, supra note 102, at 1470 ("[S]o long as discretion domi-
nates procedure, procedure will dominate substantive law.").
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to have even more discretion than they enjoy at present.2 0 6 Others
might wish for tight legislative control over procedure and short
leashes for individual judges to depart from a set procedural menu.20 7
Certainly, any significant shift out of the "box 4" paradigm can be only
partially successful unless we also address the other decentralizing ten-
dencies in our procedural system. 20 8 Selection of the proper para-
digm also intermeshes with the ways in which we propose to resolve
the civil system's competitive pressures: ADR methods tend to be at
least as discretionary as, and far more politically unaccountable than,
the present "box 4" paradigm; 20 9 conversely, many foreign systems
that have emerged from a totalitarian past justifiably take quite ajaun-
diced view of the "box 4" discretionary process. 210
Striking the proper balance between accountability and indepen-
dence is a question as central to procedural reform as the question
about the content of the rules themselves. The answer to the former
question will invariably influence the answer to the latter.
C. Representation
A third set of pressures arises from the representative nature of
American litigation. As with the problem of accountability, the pres-
sures manifest themselves in both the broad and the particular. The
broad concern involves the sacred cow Pound refused to touch: the
fate of the adversarial system. 211 The adversarial system delegates to
the parties critical adjudicatory tasks like gathering and presenting ev-
206 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 111, at 1994-97 (stating that Rule 16 could have
provided even more discretion to judges than it did).
207 Cf Resnik, supra note 189, at 431-44 (evaluating various legislative solutions or
changes in procedural rules to limit the need for case management); Jay Tidmarsh,
Unattainable Justice: The Forms of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1683, 1794-95, 1810-11 (1992) (evaluating arguments for more
certainty and less discretion in complex cases).
208 See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
209 The political unaccountability of ADR methods is a common criticism. See Fiss,
supra note 91; Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 91. But see Galanter & Cahill, supra
note 155, at 1372-75, 1378, 1382-84 (suggesting ways in which settlement might in-
crease moral and political awareness of participants); Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Signifi-
cant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REv. 881 (2004) (arguing that settlement can help moral and
political development in ways that litigation cannot).
210 See Hazard, supra note 129. This jaundiced view helps to explain the slow de-
velopment of interest in ADR methods in many other countries. See Karst, supra note
125, at 267-69 (describing the development of arbitration and mediation in Ger-
many); Xavier Vahramian & Eric Wallenbrock, France, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCE-
DURE, supra note 125, at 213, 235-38 (France).
211 On Pound's failure to consider the reform of the adversarial system, see supra
notes 73-82, 104-08 and accompanying text.
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idence, shaping legal claims, and developing legal and factual argu-
ments; the parties typically delegate these tasks to their lawyers.
Lawyers simultaneously must represent their clients' interests and, as
officers of the court, the interests of the judicial system-all the while
making a living for themselves and their families. In balancing these
priorities, the American version of the adversarial system emphasizes
loyalty to clients and to fees, which far outstrip loyalty to the justice
system. This emphasis lies at the root of many of the least seemly fea-
tures of American litigation-the constant grappling for adversarial
advantage, the refusal to comply with the spirit (and sometimes the
letter) of procedural rules, and the attendant expense, delay, and eco-
nomic distortion involved in using the public good of adjudication for
private gain. 212 The American "sporting theory ofjustice" is alive and
well, and its stubborn refusal to fade away has led some reformers to
call for significant tempering, or even for abandonment, of American
adversarialism. 213
This broad issue-the fate of adversarial process-finds manifes-
tation in the particular issue of class action and other public law litiga-
tion. The issue can be encapsulated in a simple question: "Who is the
client?" Or, put differently, who (or what) exactly does the lawyer re-
present? Developed in the nineteenth century, the adversarial sys-
tem's ethical paradigm of representing a known individual with
identified interests is inapposite. 214 Representation of large numbers
of individuals and of institutions forces lawyers to balance interests
that are typically not monolithic. Thus far, however, we have not de-
veloped an ethical language to think about lawyers' new roles. 215 Not
surprisingly, we have also been unable to create an adequate systemic
responses to the pressures of "polycentric," 216 "sprawling,"217 and
"complex" 218 modern litigation.
Instead, courts have invented ad hoc, nonadversarial procedures
to resolve complex disputes; lawyers, who often never meet the myriad
clients they represent, must use sympathetic imagination to guide
212 For an economic analysis of the inefficiencies that can arise when parties use
the public good of adjudication to achieve private gain, see STEVEN SHA\'ELL, EcO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 265-70 (1987).
213 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 104.
214 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 44-45
(1995).
215 Judge Weinstein's attempt to recast ethical rules on a communitarian and com-
municatarian basis is the most serious effort to date. See id. at 46-117.
216 See Fuller, supra note 90, at 394.
217 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997).
218 On the multiple meanings of "complex" litigation, see Tidmarsh, supra note
207, at 1692-734, 1755.
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their judgment about what their clients' interests are; clients have lost
individualized "day in court" rights-such as the ability to decide
whether, when, where, and against whom to bring suit-that are af-
forded to litigants in routine cases. Expenses in such cases can spiral
into the millions of dollars;219 the legendary delays of Jarndyce and
Jarndyce can pale in comparison;220 and the size of the plaintiffs' law-
yers' interest in the case (in terms of both potential attorneys' fees
and recovery of fronted litigation expenses) usually makes them the
largest stakeholders in the outcome, thus distorting the lawyers' incen-
tive to work in the clients' best interest.22' Despite enormous intellec-
tual energy poured into the question over the past fifty years, we lack
consensus about the proper ways to respond to the (often simultane-
ously occurring) problems of whether and when to consolidate large
numbers of dispersed victims and injurers, how best to handle vast
219 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1338-40,
1344-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (awarding nearly $1.4 million in expenses to plaintiffs' attor-
neys in a $180 million class settlement involving 2.4 million plaintiffs), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987).
220 The problem of lengthy litigation is especially problematic when a court must
administer complex remedies. For instance, the remedial question had not been fully
resolved in Brown v. Board of Education more than forty years after the case had been
originally filed on behalf of Linda Brown, an African American schoolgirl in Topeka.
She returned to federal court as a parent because she believed that vestiges of discrim-
ination remained. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851, 855 n.3 (10th Cir. 1989),
vacated, 503 U.S. 978, on remand, 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501 v. Smith, 509 U.S. 903 (1993).
Jarndyce and Jarndyce, of course, is the fictional, long-running suit in equity
around which Dickens twists the plot of Bleak House. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE
(Dent 1907) (1853). People, including Dickens himself, have asserted that there was
more truth than fiction in Dickens' description. Id. at xv-xvi.
221 See "Agent Orange, " 611 F. Supp. at 1338-40, 1344-46 (awarding more than
$9.3 million in attorneys' fees in a $180 million class settlement involving 2.4 million
plaintiffs); Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 591,
638-40 & tbl.15 (2006) (stating that median recovery in state class actions removed to
federal courts and remanded to state courts was $850,000, median class contained
5000 members, median per capita recovery was $350, and average attorneys' fee was
thirty percent of the class recovery; median recovery in federal class actions removed
to federal courts and not remanded was $300,000, median number of class members
was 1000, median per capita recovery was $517, and median attorneys' fee was twenty-
five percent of the class recovery). See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (describing ways
in which economic and ethical incentives of plaintiffs' class action lawyers diverge
from those of their clients); Note, Risk-Preference Asymmetries in Class Action Litigation,
119 HARv. L. REv. 587, 588 (2005) (discussing how divergent risk preferences for
plaintiffs' class action lawyers and their clients affect the decision to settle).
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quantities of information while streamlining issues for trial, and how
best to deliver a meaningful adjudicatory remedy to the deserving.
The broad question of the fate of the adversarial system and the
particular question of the future of complex litigation intermingle.
Complex litigation presents a circumstance in which the adversarial
system functions poorly, and the corrective remedy is the application
of nonadversarial judicial power.222 That the adversarial system does
not perform well over a set of cases is unremarkable; no system can be
expected to perform optimally in every setting. But complex litigation
is pervasive in our society, touching the lives of millions of citizens
each year and restructuring major governmental and private institu-
tions.223 If the adversarial system performs poorly in this central form
of litigation, then we must consider reforms. Two options are evident.
The first is to create a separate, nonadversarial (and perhaps nonjudi-
cial) system for complex cases; such a system would establish a new
form of dispute resolution, akin to equity's rise as a counterpoint to
common law in medieval times. The second, more radical option is to
pull the adversarial system up by the roots for all types of litigation,
and to replace it with another model that better addresses the needs
of complex cases while performing reasonably well in other cases as
well.
Theory can help us to choose between these options. Writingjust
at the inception of the public-law-litigation phenomenon, Lon Fuller
argued that only the first option was legitimate. Professor Fuller
thought that the adversarial system was an optimal-and possibly es-
sential-aspect of the form of adjudication. 224 Because the adver-
sarial system, with its emphasis on affected individuals' participation
in the decisionmaking process, was incapable of providing for such
participation in "polycentric" disputes, Fuller thought that the form of
222 For an extended proof of this proposition, see TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra
note 129.
223 See Chayes, supra note 88, at 1284.
224 See Fuller, supra note 90, at 382-85. Because of the way in which this posthu-
mously published article was edited for publication-by shoehorning into a hole in
Fuller's text another article that Fuller had written about the adversarial system-it is
not clear whether Fuller regarded adversarial process as merely optimal to adjudica-
tion or rather so essential to its very nature that nonadversarial process was inherently
illegitimate as an adjudicatory process. See id. at 382 n.22. For a sensitive rendering
of Fuller's theory of adjudication, which suggests that adversarialism might indeed
have been essential to Fuller's view, see Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller's Theory of Adjudica-
tion and the False Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation,
75 B.U. L. REN,. 1273, 1301-10 (1995).
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adjudication was unsuited to the resolution of such disputes. 225 The
solution for polycentric disputes lay only in nonadjudicatory forms of
dispute resolution-either in the political/administrative process or
through contract. 22 6
On the other hand, Pound fairly might be read to advocate the
second option of eliminating the adversarial system altogether. Even
in his own legal world, which involved the retrospective, dyadic dis-
putes that the adversarial approach contemplated, Pound saw clearly
the disadvantages of the adversarial process. Rather than following
the logic of his diagnosis, Pound stopped short, and seemed to hope
that other reforms to the procedural system would rein in adversarial
zeal. Seventy-five years of experience with his system suggest that he
was too optimistic about converting lawyers into officers of the court.
To some extent, the fault might lie with judges who never fully inter-
nalized Pound's point to use procedural discretion only to achieve
resolutions on the merits. But a greater problem has been the oppor-
tunity that loosely textured rules have given lawyers to maneuver and
game in order to achieve the single-minded objective that all the sea
changes in American procedural rules have never dislodged: victory
for their clients.
Our procedural history also has something to say about the
choice between creating differential rules for complex cases or aban-
doning the adversarial approach to adjudication outright. The com-
mon law developed distinct procedures for each writ, and equity
developed still different procedures. The lack of uniformity among
substantive areas, and the resultant complexity of the procedural sys-
tem, was the equivalent of putting the adversarial inclination toward
hyper-technical procedural enforcement on steroids. Although it
took centuries to accomplish, the abolition of differential procedures
and the creation of a "trans-substantive" procedural code are often
regarded as the most successful dimensions of the Federal Rules. 227
225 To Fuller, "polycentric" disputes usually involved many parties, fluid interests,
and no evidently correct legal principles that resolved the dispute. See Fuller, supra
note 90, at 394-98. "Polycentric" litigation is sometimes used as a synonym for "com-
plex" litigation. See Tidmarsh, supra note 207, at 1726-31.
226 Fuller, supra note 90, at 398.
227 See Shapiro, supra note 111, at 1973-78. "Trans-substantive" rules are rules
that apply uniformly across substantive areas of the law. The common law writ system,
with separate procedures for each form of action, and the equity system, with still
different procedures for suits in equity, were not trans-substantive. One of the goals
of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was to make the rules trans-
substantive, both by abolishing the distinction between common law and equity, see
FED. R. Civ. P. 2, and (with a few exceptions) by making the same rules apply uni-
formly to all types of legal claims.
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The idea of returning to the multiple forms of action that preceded
the Rules commands no disciples. 228
Indeed, history suggests that a dichotomy between the complex
and the routine cannot in the long run be sustained. When the Amer-
ican system first confronted complex cases in the 1940s, a consensus
emerged that this new type of litigation required the control of an
"iron-hearted judge,"229 a far more active figure than the judge of
umpireal restraint. A procedural system that already devolved author-
ity to the local level became the ready-made vehicle for the assertion
of iron-hearted power. Interestingly, the original view was that judges
should exercise their newly claimed authority by imposing hard-and-
fast (i.e., nondiscretionary) rules to handle complex cases,230 but that
effort fell apart in the 1960s as judges began to realize that one size of
procedural rule did not fit all. 23 1 Discretion again became the watch-
228 The typical criticism is that the drafters failed to go far enough and accom-
plished only superficial trans-substantivity by vesting judges with discretion that made
the rules appear uniform on paper even though the rules varied in practice from case
to case. See Shapiro, supra note 111, at 1978. A few voices have questioned the very
wisdom of the trans-substantive project, either because trans-substantivity masks sub-
stantive policy choices or because non-trans-substantivity creates a better fit between
substantive policy and adjudicated outcomes. For a variety of criticisms and defenses
of trans-substantivity, see Burbank, Complexity, supra note 102, at 1474-75; Carrington,
supra note 162, at 2067; Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudica-
tory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 526-27, 547-48 (1986); Subrin, supra
note 72, at 991. None, however, has advocated a return to the myriad procedural
forms of the common law.
229 This phrase was coined in a 1951 speech given by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman,
then a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GROUP ON PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIG., HANDBOOK
OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES (1960), reprinted
in 25 F.R.D. 351, 384 (1960) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. Judge Prettyman was the prin-
cipal author of the document known as the Prettyman Report, which is often described
as the opening salvo in the effort to apply case management principles to complex
litigation. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROCEDURE IN ANTI-TRUST
AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES (1951), reprinted in 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953); see id. at 66
(stating that adversarial presentation in complex cases "will result in records of fantas-
tic size and complexity unless the trial judge exercises rigid control from the time the
complaint is filed"); TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 129, at 926, 928.
230 The Handbook was the first manual of recommended judicial practices in com-
plex litigation and the precursor to the Manual for Complex Litigation (first written in
1970 and now in its fourth edition). Although it couched its approach in the lan-
guage of "recommendations," the Handbook had a fairly well defined and rigid ap-
proach to the way in which judges should handle protracted cases. See, e.g.,
HANDBOOK, supra note 229, at 377-98, 403-14.
231 The successor to the Handbook tended to take less definitive positions on the
ways in which complex litigation should be managed by the judge. See MANUAL FOR
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word, and judges exercised it in decidedly nonadversarial ways. 2 3 2
The pre-existing system of procedural discretion, which Pound had
proposed to remedy a different ill, was turned toward the new end of
addressing complex litigation.233
The rest of the story is well known. With the perceived success of
greater judicial authority in complex cases, the line between the com-
plex and the ordinary began to blur, and judges started to exercise
more control over ordinary litigation.234 The case management ap-
proach, which occupies a middle ground between the adversarial and
inquisitorial models, now represents the state of the art in all Ameri-
can civil litigation. 23 5 It has closed the gap between the procedures
used in routine cases and those used in complex ones.236 Whether it
takes centuries, as with common law and equity, or only decades, as
with complex and routine litigation, the centripetal force of proce-
dure makes it difficult for a single society to maintain differential pro-
cedural approaches in the long run.
COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION XiX (1970) (" [F]lexibility should be the key-
note in applying the suggestions contained in this Manual."). This manual went
through a number of interim editions, supplements, and a retitling to the Manual for
Complex Litigation. By 1985, when the Manual was rewritten from stem to stern, the
transformation from a one-size-fits-all code to a menu of discretionary procedural op-
tions was complete. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 10 (1985).
232 For instance, judges claimed the power to choose the lead counsel for groups
of clients. See Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 773 (9th Cir. 1977).
For a range of other judicial powers that depart from the adversarial ideal, see JAY
TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION: PROBLEMS IN ADVANCED
CIVIL PROCEDURE 201-69 (2002); Chayes, supra note 88.
233 This shift further documents the ways in which the judiciary can reorient a
discretionary procedural system to accomplish new policy goals that it has estab-
lished-without necessarily changing the underlying rules. See supra notes 201-04
and accompanying text. For the most part, the changes occurred under the auspices
of the courts' "inherent power." See generally RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers
of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001) (analyzing
claims of inherent judicial power in complex litigation and other contexts). Changes
in Rule 16(c), such as the 1983 addition of a catch-all case management power for
complex cases (now found in Rule 16(c)(12)), essentially confirmed pre-existing
claims of power. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c). See Shapiro, supra note 111, at 1992-93.
234 See Resnik, supra note 189, at 377-80.
235 See FED. R. Crv. P. 16; FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR LITIGATION MANAGE-
MENT AND COST AND DELAY REDUCTION 1-4 (1993); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) 2 (2004) ("[T]he judge should not take the case from the lawyers, but
rather provide guidance and direction, setting limits and applying controls as
needed.").
236 A gap still remains. Some case management techniques are likely to be useful
only in complex cases.
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The critical question is whether we should remain in case man-
agement's middle ground, whether we should continue the march
away from the adversarial approach and toward the even more power-
ful judge of the inquisitorial system, or whether we should head back
toward the adversarialism of our heritage. Wrapped up in this ques-
tion is the question whether further moves away from adversarial pro-
cess, which corresponds well to competitive American culture and to
the American preference for limited judicial authority,2 37 can be suc-
cessful without changes in our national character. 238 Also wrapped up
in this question is the constitutional issue of due process, and how
much it permits departures from an adversarial approach to
litigation. 239
Finally, wrapped up in the question of adversarialism's future is
the matter of handling complex cases-in particular, the mass torts
that have consumed considerable intellectual energy in the so-far elu-
sive search for a solution. 240 Perhaps the Holy Grail of complex litiga-
tion reform-a method that combines broad consolidation of similar
claims with individualized adjudicatory treatment of each such claim,
all accomplished in a manner that does not skew outcomes markedly
in relation to outcomes achieved through routine methods of process-
ing lawsuits-does not exist. The greatest lesson of complex litiga-
tion, however, is the understanding that no distribution of the
adjudicatory roles of factfinding, fact gathering, and claim develop-
ment is perfect. Every method-whether it be that of the adversarial
method, the inquisitorial method, or some hybrid-has undesirable
side effects. That reality highlights the next set of questions. What
characteristics should the inevitably imperfect procedures embody:
rough equality of outcomes among complex cases and between the
complex and the routine; rough equality of procedural opportunity
among complex cases and between the complex and the routine; effi-
ciency and speed of resolution of myriad claims; accurate, "on the
merits" adjudication of individual claims; or the opportunity of all in-
237 DAMAsKA, supra note 92, at 214-22; see alsoJonathan T. Molot, An 01d Judicial
Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 30 (2003) (arguing for an emphasis on
the traditional adjudicative judicial role as a response to modem procedural
concerns).
238 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. In the procedural context, "due
process" is a phrase with multiple meanings. See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note
232, at 2-3.
240 See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS, RE-
PORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION (1999).
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dividuals to have their "day in court," represented by the lawyer of
their choosing?
As a functional matter, a procedural system is likely to be most
stable when its allocation of roles deals well with the disputes that a
society thinks most important, and less perfectly suits the subset of
cases that the society judges to be fairly unimportant. Therefore, con-
sidering whether our system should continue to pull slowly away from
adversarial process forces us to think substantively as we think proce-
durally. Despite our modern inclination to cordon off procedure and
substance, 241 the one cannot be considered apart from the other. On
this matter, Pound was surely correct.
D. Theorization
In the end, none of the other pressures that our procedural sys-
tem faces can be resolved without new ideas, or at least a recovery and
reapplication of old ideas. But a fourth and final difficulty infects
modern American procedure: lack of vigorous theoretical attention.
Assume that the proverbial Martian came to Earth and asked us,
"What is civil procedure about?" We would likely answer, "It is about
the rules courts use to resolve civil disputes." But what if the Martian
then said, "No, you misunderstand. What is civil procedure about?"
How would we answer? What are the driving forces or ideas behind
procedure? What theoretical concepts make it tick?
Procedural law is undertheorized. When I talk about underthe-
orization, I do not necessarily mean the lack of connection to the fan-
ciest metaphysical construction or the most recent interdisciplinary
insight that is removed by several levels of abstraction from the con-
cerns of everyday litigators. Instead, I mean a connection to ideas that
are deeper than the rules themselves. These ideas are guideposts that
determine the skeleton of the procedural system; they are specific
enough that, through the use of practical reason, they can help to put
some flesh on the bones as well. As Pound would have appreciated,
they spring from philosophy, political theory, economics, history, soci-
ology, and other disciplines, as well as from lived experience. They
provide a sense of purpose and direction for the rules we use; they
have predictive force for how we should handle new procedural con-
texts; hopefully they exercise a moral suasion that make us believe
that this approach is what we ought to be pursuing. Ideally, they con-
nect to the ideas that drive the substantive law. Such ideas are not the
sole determinants of a procedural system; they interact with history,
241 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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tradition, and culture in a struggle for the dominant role in determin-
ing procedural rules. 242
The dominant determinants of procedure today, as they were
when Pound spoke, are history, tradition, and culture. Pound infused
a new set of ideas that muscled into a dominant role; they moved the
procedural paradigm markedly. Today "big" ideas have receded as a
critical determinant of procedural rules. We have fallen into the habit
of working mostly within the history, tradition, and culture of the par-
adigm that Pound gave us. 243 We do not ask, as Pound asked, what
procedure should be about. We are on theoretical autopilot. We no
longer have a theory of procedure adequate to today's needs.
The present American system rests on four theoretical founda-
tions: "on the merits" decisions; decentralized decisionmaking (an
idea broad enough to encompass both jury trial and judicial discre-
tion); respect for individual autonomy (an idea that includes both ad-
versarial process and equal rights of participation); and efficiency. To
some extent the foundations are reinforcing, and to some extent they
are in tension.244 The weight we have placed on each foundation has
shifted over time. "On the merits" decisions were a more dominant
idea in the early years of the Federal Rules; consistent with the general
rise in law-and-economics thinking, concerns for efficiency have as-
serted a stronger voice in the past quarter-century.2 45 Despite these
242 1 do not wish to engage in the "chicken and egg" question whether history,
tradition, and culture emerge from ideas, or ideas from history, tradition, and cul-
ture. My only claim is that ideas are distinct from the others, but interact with them
to produce human actions.
243 More accurately, the present procedural paradigm has resulted from the inter-
action of Pound's ideas with prior historical, traditional, and cultural influences.
244 For instance, a decentralized form of adjudication and the adversarial system
have evident reinforcing connections. See supra text following note 186. Likewise, the
principles of efficiency and "on the merits" decisions have a close relationship. From
an efficiency viewpoint, the costs of litigation are a form of transaction cost that act as
a drag on the efficient working of substantive legal rules. As a general matter, the
goal of an efficient procedural system is to keep litigation costs to a minimum. Litiga-
tion costs come in two types: the direct costs of litigation (attorneys' fees, court costs,
and the like) and the indirect costs of erroneous decisions. The two types of litigation
costs are often inversely related; as the amount of resources devoted to a case goes up,
the chance of an erroneous decision goes down, and vice versa. See POSNER, supra
note 116, § 21.1. Error costs are simply the flip side of deciding cases accurately. And
deciding cases accurately is deciding cases "on their merits."
As for tensions, one evident tension, which Pound emphasized, is the difficult
relationship between the adversarial system and merits-based decisions. See supra
notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
245 Among the significant changes that were made in the 1983, 1993, and 2000
amendments were those to Rule 11 (creating penalties for frivolous filings), Rules
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shifts, we can clearly identify the core ideas of our system as the ones
Pound identified a century ago. For the most part, the ideas are not
deeply theorized. 246 With the exception of judicial discretion, Pound
himself never defended any of these ideas with the theoretical rigor
that he applied to his general theory of sociological jurisprudence.
Those following after him have not done much better in justifying this
approach.
The question is why we have held onto Pound's theoretical vision
for so long. The remainder of Pound's jurisprudence was also highly
influential-probably more influential than the ideas of any American
lawyer or legal academic during the past century247 -but it had run its
course within twenty-five years.248 By the time that the Federal Rules
were enacted in 1938, the ideas driving substantive law had swept past
Pound. That reality made the point of Pound's enterprise-meshing
the substantive and the procedural into a unified whole that advanced
the cause of sociological jurisprudence-obsolete before it had even
begun. As substantive law has endured succeeding waves of new
16(b)-(f) (expanding case management powers), Rule 26(a) (requiring various types
of mandatory disclosure), Rule 26(b) (adding a proportionality requirement), Rule
26(f) (requiring discovery planning), Rule 26 (g) (imposing sanctions for bad-faith
discovery or discovery responses), Rule 30 (limiting number and length of deposi-
tions), Rule 33 (limiting interrogatories), and Rule 37(a) (4) (A) (requiring a good-
faith conference as a precondition to obtaining sanctions on a motion to compel).
See infra notes 294-96 (providing a timeline for these amendments). A driving moti-
vation behind each of these changes was the desire to reduce expenses and delays in
adversarial litigation.
246 Pound himself mentioned jury trials and efficiency only in passing, see supra
notes 46-48, 80 and accompanying text, was silent about equal rights of participation,
and was critical of adversarial process (even though he was willing to maintain it on
changed terms), see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
247 Making such a claim is subjective. I could make a comparable claim for Chief
Justice Earl Warren and perhaps for a handful of other scholars or judges who came
after Pound. But Pound certainly stands in rare company. A century later, it is easy to
forget how much Pound dominated the legal landscape, and for how long. See Ste-
phen B. Presser, Foreword to RosCOE POUND, THE IDEAL ELEMENT IN LAW vii, vii,
xvi-xvii (Liberty Fund 2002) (1958).
248 The end of Pound's significant influence on American legal thought can be
dated to 1931, when he clearly broke with the dominant legal realism. Compare
Pound, Realist Jurisprudence, supra note 19 (summarizing and critiquing aspects of le-
gal realism), with Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222 (1931) (criticizing Pound for his stance on realism).
Pound continued to write prolifically, but his increasingly conservative turn often con-
tradicted his earlier ideas and never had a significant influence on the direction of
American law. See WIGDOR, supra note 3, at 257-75; Presser, supra note 247, at
xv-xviii (arguing that Pound's later ideas still retain their validity and should now
have a force that they did not enjoy at their own time).
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ideas-realism, a return to doctrinalism, legal process, the rise of neo-
conceptualist moral and economic theories, critical legal theory, the
resurgence of pragmatism, and interdisciplinarity24 9-procedure has
stayed the course set by Pound a century ago.
Nor is the procedural community engaged in efforts to discover
or recover ideas that might relieve the pressures that the modem
world has created for Pound's system. Rarely does our scholarship
(and here I refer to the collective work of the academy, the bench,
and the bar) reexamine the balance of foundational principles of civil
procedure when it discusses how to handle this point or reform that
matter; even more rarely does scholarship criticize the foundations of
our system or suggest either new ideas or a new procedural
paradigm. 250
The result has been a reemergence of procedural formalism: the
application of existing rules with little attention to the larger direc-
tions in law and society. Pound was aware that procedural rules re-
quired a certain formal dimension, 251 but he tried to integrate his
substantive and procedural system to work in tandem to stamp out an
excessively formal approach. And that fact is the larger point we now
miss in Pound's insights. Pound promoted a single idea-discretion
in both substantive rules and in procedural administration of those
rules-as the antidote to the malaise of the legal world of the early
twentieth century. But that world and its problems are not our world
and our problems. We deserve a procedural system geared to our
circumstances.
The modem grand theories of substantive law fail where Pound
succeeded: They do not consider the procedural system that gives the
theories their greatest effect. 252 Most of the great legal philosophers
249 For descriptions of some of the jurisprudential movements up to 1980, see G.
EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA (1980). On critical theory, see, for example,
Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 561 (1983). On
the resurgence of pragmatism in the 1980s and 1990s, see, for example, Symposium,
Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990).
On the rise of interdisciplinary scholarship, see, for example, Richard A. Posner, Legal
Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1314 (2002).
250 Some procedural scholarship is theoretically sophisticated and potentially par-
adigm-shifting. See, e.g., DUE PROCESS: NoMos XVIII U. Pennock &J. Chapman eds.,
1977); Mashaw, supra note 96; Michelman, supra note 96.
251 See supra notes 29, 63 and accompanying text.
252 The one exception is law-and-economics scholarship, which easily fits the mini-
mization of litigation expenses and many other procedural issues into its larger juris-
prudential world view. See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 164, at 135-46; POSNER, supra
note 116, §§ 21.1-18. But even this scholarship has its imaginative limits. Economic
analysis still tends to take as a baseline many of the major foundational principles of
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of the past century devote scant attention to questions of procedure;
and when they do, they typically discuss procedure at a level of platitu-
dinous generality that concerns criminal more than civil proce-
dure. 253 Pound is as responsible as anyone for this failing, because he
convinced us that procedural rules were a matter of mere administra-
tion that could deliver justice seamlessly. 25 4 The failing is nonetheless
unfortunate on two dimensions. First, procedural thought is deprived
of a fertile source of ferment. Second, describing the optimal practi-
cal processes needed to administer a substantive theory helps us to
take a fuller measure of the theory itself. Although an ideal substan-
tive theory has intrinsic value, lawyers are people of the world, and a
theory that cannot be practically applied serves as its own criticism in
most legal circles. By neglecting procedure, modern jurisprudence
neglects its opportunity to be efficacious.
To Pound's credit, he understood that procedure was about some-
thing important. It was a critical dimension of his larger theory of law,
and was a central component of his program for systematic legal re-
form. We have lost that sense today. We remain mired in a procedu-
ral no-person's land. We continue to use a procedural system
designed to fight a century-old jurisprudential war that no longer
procedural law, and then either seeks to justify them in economic terms or suggests
modest changes in rules. For instance, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), with
its three-factor cost-benefit analysis for determining the constitutionality of taking
away certain procedural protections, is often regarded as a high point in economic
thinking about procedural questions. Id. at 335. But Mathews v. Eldridge accepted as
given a baseline of adversarial process, and asked only whether departures from the
baseline were constitutional; it did not arrange its three factors into a mathematically
precise marginal-cost formula, nor did it purport to hold that the most efficient pro-
cedural system was constitutionally required. In other contexts, the Supreme Court
has made clear that certain procedural protections are constitutionally required with-
out regard to the arguable economic inefficiencies they create. See, e.g., Richards v.
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
253 For two examples, see RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72-103
(1985); RAwLs, supra note 83, at 54-60, 235-43. On questions of adjudication, Profes-
sor Rawls's work is heavily influenced by his colleague, Lon Fuller. See RAWLS, supra
note 83, at 59 n.6, 235 n,20, 238 n.21; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the
Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783-91 (1989) (comparing Fuller's and Rawls's views
on the nature of the rule of law). Fuller was perhaps not a "great" legal philosopher,
but he took procedural issues in the civil context seriously. See Fuller, supra note 90.
254 A related reason is that legal realism, with which Pound was loosely associated
and which paid a great deal of attention to questions of law and adjudication, is not
treated seriously by most contemporary legal philosophers. See Michael Steven
Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2005); Brian
Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REv. 267,
275 (1997).
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rages.255 Procedure is not oriented to present theoretical turns in sub-
stantive law. It is not deeply theorized as an independent value sys-
tem. Until we see procedure as both a source of and a laboratory for
important ideas, we cannot solve the other pressures that procedure
faces.
III. DIEc-riONS FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM
In his imaginative survey of human civilization, Alfred North
Whitehead distinguished between Hellenic and Hellenistic eras in his-
tory. In the former, as in the early days of Athenian democratic cul-
ture, a brilliant new idea dawns; innovation, excitement, and reaching
beyond known modes of discourse and structure abound. In the lat-
ter, as in the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, concentration, thor-
oughness, and scholasticism work the original idea into a detailed and
specific set of institutions and structures-losing in the process the
freshness of the original insight or the desire to strive toward even
greater possibilities. 256 Whitehead argued that both types of creativity
were necessary to progress, that Hellenic striving was generally supe-
rior to Hellentistic maintenance, 257 and that both were superior to
listless times when societies pursued no creative ideals.258
Following Whitehead's distinctions here, Pound's 1906 speech
and his work over the ensuing several years was our most recent pe-
riod of procedural Hellenism. We became more Hellenistic as we
moved from the establishment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
through the procedural reforms of the 1960s and early 1970s-trying
to work out in more detail specific aspects of the original vision while
counteracting the vision's side effects. By the 1980s our direction in
procedure was no longer as clear. The costs of Pound's vision were
becoming apparent. But we had no Hellenic moment-no new
255 Pound's war was intended to eliminate excessive formalism. See supra notes
14-15 and accompanying text. Advocates of some type of formalism remain. See Sym-
posium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. RE\,. 527 (1999); Frederick Schauer, Formal-
ism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent
Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). Moreover, anyone who reads legal briefs
and judicial opinions, especially at the trial level, can find a great deal of evidence of
legal formalism's persistence in practice. But modern formalism operates in a very
different way than formalism of a century ago. The adage that "we are all realists
now," see Leiter, supra note 254, at 267 (discussing this "cliche"), conveys the truth
that questions of fact and policy bear on our collective consideration about the ar-
rangement and effects of legal rules, whether or not they rise to the surface in opin-
ions and briefs.
256 See ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF IDEAS 134-38 (1933).
257 See id.
258 See id. at 357-60.
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idea-to inspire us. Instead, we tossed upon the ocean, buffeted in
the 1980s by concerns for inefficiency and by disaffection with the
sharp practices of a lawyer-driven, costly, and dilatory litigation sys-
tem.259 Political pressures to reform procedure to achieve short-term
policy objectives blew in during the 1990s. 260 Transnational pres-
sures26 1 and the concern for the "vanishing trial"262 brought water
into the boat in the 2000s. Nonetheless, if I might extend the meta-
phor a last time, we are still afloat on Pound's ocean. We cannot-or
at least have not-imagined a fresher and better approach to
procedure.
Like Pound's 1906 speech, this Article has focused principally on
diagnosis of present problems rather than the prescription for a new
Hellenic moment. Although some of the rough outlines were already
apparent in 1906, Pound left his prescription to future articles written
over the next half-dozen years. I must also leave the bulk of the pre-
scription to future work. But allow me to adumbrate a few of the cen-
tral points of a new program for procedural reform. In many ways,
they mirror those that Pound made-not at the level of detail, but at
the level of structure and animating spirit.
A. A New Merger
When Pound spoke, the federal courts and the courts of most
states operated with separate spheres of law and equity. An ancient
peculiarity of English law transplanted to America, the separate sys-
tems had little justification in theory but deep-rooted standing in his-
tory. As a purely practical matter, the use of juries only on the
common law side and the influence of canon law's inquisitorial
method on the equitable side generated vastly different procedural
practices. In 1906, when Pound urged the abolition of the distinction,
the procedural chasm between the systems had already broken down
in some jurisdictions, and it was ripe to break down everywhere. 263
259 For some of the procedural changes developed in and since the 1980s, see
supra note 106.
260 See statutes cited supra note 103.
261 See supra notes 120-48 and accompanying text.
262 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
263 For instance, states that adopted code pleading typically merged the two sys-
tems and created a single set of procedural rules applicable to both law and equity
(with due allowances, of course, for the peculiar needs of thejury in old common law
actions). See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ETAL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.7 (5th ed. 2001). Even in
jurisdictions in which the two forms ofjustice remained separate, the systems of pro-
cedure were drawing closer together. For instance, equity traditionally eschewed the
common law's preference for live testimony, relying instead on written deposition
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A century later, the challenge is no longer to merge law and eq-
uity; that was done at the federal level in 1938.264 Our challenge is
greater. We must merge our present legal procedure with the "new
equity": the disputes that are resolved through alternate methods of
dispute resolution. Just as equity arose in response to the failings of
the common law-failings that were in their day almost entirely proce-
dural in nature265 -alternative methods of dispute resolution have
arisen largely in response to perceived procedural deficiencies in the
modern administration of legal rules.
The claim that ADR is mostly a response to procedural deficien-
cies might seem surprising at first blush. But if modern procedural
rules delivered fast, cheap, and accurate results, and if courtrooms
were available in unlimited supply, wouldn't the likeliest fatality be
ADR? Four situations might arguably lead parties to sign an arbitra-
tion clause: (1) dissatisfaction with the substantive legal rule that will
be applied in all relevant jurisdictions; (2) dissatisfaction with the sub-
stantive legal rule that will be applied in some of the relevant jurisdic-
tions; (3) dissatisfaction with the procedures that will be applied in all
relevant jurisdictions; and (4) dissatisfaction with the procedures that
will be applied in some of the relevant jurisdictions. Assuming that
the potentially aggrieved party has sufficient bargaining power, the
second situation can be handled by a choice-of-law clause, and the
fourth by a forum selection clause. 266 As for the first situation, if the
testimony and documents for evidence. After the Equity Rules of 1912 that slightly
post-dated Pound's speech, the federal courts generally heard the testimony of wit-
nesses "orally in open court." FED. EQurn' R. 46, 226 U.S. 661 (1912) (repealed
1938). For a brief discussion of the 1912 Rules, see supra note 4.
264 See FED. R. Crv. P. 2.
265 Sometimes the story is told that equity arose to redress the common law's sub-
stantive failings-for instance, by creating a law of trusts or by recognizing fraud as a
contractual defense when the common law refused to do so. But this story incorrectly
assumes that medieval lawyers thought in substantive terms. The reason that the com-
mon law failed to create trusts or recognize fraud as a defense was that common law
judges refused to create forms or procedures to raise these issues. Thus, the impe-
tuses for the rise of equity were the common law's increasing procedural rigidity and
the limitation of the common law's procedures (especially the fallible jury). People
did not perceive equity to be applying substantive rules that varied in any significant
different way from those applied at law. F.W. MAITLAND, EQurrY 4-6 (A. H. Chaytor &
W. J. Whittaker eds., 2d ed., 1936).
266 On the enforceability of a choice-of-law clause, see Mastrobuono v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U.S. 69 (1900).
On the enforceability of a forum selection clause, see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses can be negoti-
ated in the same contract. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer,
515 U.S. 528 (1995). If a party has sufficient bargaining power to obtain an arbitra-
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legal norms are universally accepted, it is unlikely that an arbitrator
will choose a rule of decision that varies significantly from the law. 267
Therefore, the principal reason for selecting a nonlitigated solution
must be the perceived disadvantages (such as expense, delay, and un-
predictability) of the litigation system's procedural rules. ADR must
nevertheless be seen as a rebellion against the undesirable conse-
quences of modern procedural rules, in the same way that equity was a
rebellion against the undesirable procedural effects of the common
law system.
The rise of ADR is the analog to the rise of equity in other ways as
well. ADR promises a decision tailored to the exact facts (I am
tempted to say "the equities") of each dispute. As a result, the deci-
sions typically have little precedential effect in later circumstances-
just as equity, with its mission to do "complete justice" between the
parties, operated in its early centuries with little sense of stare
decisis. 268
One historical irony blunts the equity-ADR analogy. Equity arose
in large measure from two causes-concern with juries and the inflexi-
bility (along with the attendant effect of failing to reach the merits) of
common law procedure. 269 Today, two of the principal reasons that
parties opt for ADR are concern for juries and the flexibility (along
with the attendant effects of costs and delay) of modern procedure.
The analogy nonetheless holds, for, like equity, mediation and arbitra-
tion promise even more flexibility than the litigation procedures they
replace. The one significant difference from equity, which is also the
reason that the parties are willing to accept such additional flexibility,
is that mediation and arbitration often employ sophisticated and ex-
pert decisionmakers. Expert decisionmakers possess the background
knowledge to frame the dispute, often require only incremental dis-
closures of information in order to render a decision, and can ignore
procedural niceties in favor of deciding the case on its merits.2
70
tion clause, he or she presumably has the power to obtain a choice-of-law or forum
selection clause.
267 See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861
(1961) (noting that eighty percent of domestic commercial arbitrators "thought that
they ought to reach their decisions within the context of the principles of substantive
rules of law, but almost 90 per cent believed that they were free to ignore these rules
whenever they thought that more just decisions would be reached by so doing").
268 The concept of stare decisis did not become established in equity until 1676.
See Cook v. Fountain, (1676) 3 Swans. 585, 36 Eng. Rep. 984 (Ch.); supra note 191
and accompanying text.
269 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
270 See Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Posi-
tive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 2328, 2341-42 (2004). Of course,
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In a sense, expert arbitrators and mediators are the true descend-
ants of the judges that Pound dreamed of educating-experts knowl-
edgeable about the social sciences and business practices on which the
resolution of disputes should turn.271 Their control over both the es-
tablishment of the norms used to determine the dispute and the dis-
pute resolution process provides the cohesive integration of substance
and procedure that Pound sought for the litigation system. At least
this is the theory, and perhaps also the practice on ADR's best days.
Unfortunately, arbitrators and mediators do not always possess rele-
vant expertise; and when they do, the fear exists that they can become
captured by it. There is little doubt that a mediator with a career as a
union negotiator will frame the discussions differently than the media-
tor with a career in management-side labor law. Likewise, there is rea-
son to doubt the neutrality of securities arbitrators whose livelihood
depends on arbitration clauses negotiated by the industry that estab-
lishes and supports their arbitration practices. 272 I do not mean to
suggest an inherent bias in all ADR processes involving third-party
neutrals, or to suggest that judges have no biases. Nonetheless, unlike
litigation, the third-party mediator or arbitrator declares the behav-
ioral norms, controls the procedure, and determines the facts. Not
surprisingly, in many mediations and arbitrations, the principal fight
concerns the identity of the mediator(s) or arbitrator(s)-precisely
because everyone understands how important this preliminary deci-
sion is to the outcome.27 3
These concerns, which existed as well for Pound's ideal judge,
distinguish both Pound's vision and ADR from traditional equity, in
which the Chancellor typically did not possess relevant expertise. De-
spite this difference, we ignore the parallels between the rise of equity
and the rise of ADR at our peril. As our ancestors painfully learned
over the course of centuries, maintaining a system split between law
and equity is disastrous and ultimately indefensible. Similarly, our
procedural imagination must find ways to reach across the litigation-
arbitrators do not always possess the relevant expertise. See McDonald v. City of West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1984).
271 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
272 Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L.
REv. 151, 164-65 (2004).
273 In many mediation or arbitration agreements, each party chooses one media-
tor or arbitrator, and they then choose the third mediator or arbitratorjointly. In the
event that the parties cannot agree, then upon agreement an external organization
such as the American Arbitration Association can appoint the third neutral. See, e.g.,
AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES
M-4, R-11 to R-17 (2005), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440.
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ADR divide, and to merge the best of both systems. One obvious sub-
ject for consideration is the creation of expert judges sitting in special-
ized courts, akin to Delaware's Chancery Court that deals with
corporate litigation.274 But that idea is only the tip of the iceberg.
Similar arguments might be made about the need to merge the
procedural systems of various countries into a transnational procedu-
ral code. The "new equity" could describe the litigation systems of
other countries-or at least a system of transnational procedural rules
that seeks compromise between the American system and those of
other nations. Thus far, however, the comparison between foreign or
transnational procedural norms and English equity seems inapt. A set
of transnational rules has just been adopted, 275 and it is far too early
to say if these rules will pose a sufficiently strong counterpoint to the
procedures used in litigation and international arbitration to be
deemed a "new equity." These transnational rules contain studied am-
biguities at critical points, a fact that understandably leaves room for
each country to meld local practices into the rules but that makes less
likely the near-term development of a single, coherent procedural al-
ternative that can compete against American litigation in the way that
equity competed against law.
An ambitious effort might be to seek a merger not just of litiga-
tion and ADR, but of litigation, ADR, and the procedural norms of
other countries. Such triangulation requires immense imagination.
In some ways, two systems will intractably be pitted against one; for
instance, civil juries are often used in American litigation, but not typi-
cally in ADR or the litigation systems of foreign countries.276 In other
ways, each system is pitted against the other; for instance, American
litigation creates significant opportunities to exercise discretion in ad-
274 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679, 708-15 (2002) (comparing Delaware's "high quality" Chancery
Court to several other proposed or established tribunals with some business
expertise).
275 See ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULEs OF TRANSNATIONAL CML PROCE-
DURE (Am. Law Inst. & UNIDROIT 2004).
276 On the use ofjuries in American litigation, see supra notes 140-45 and accom-
panying text. The only ADR technique that generally uses juries is the summary jury
trial, which is a form of mediation (if nonbinding) or arbitration (if binding). Sum-
mary jury trial is rarely employed. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury
Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53
U. CHI. L. REv. 366 (1986) (noting infrequent use, and discussing benefits and draw-
backs of summary jury trial). For the lack of juries in other legal systems, see supra
note 140 and accompanying text.
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ministering procedural rules,277 ADR creates even more opportunities
for the arbitrator or mediator to exercise both procedural and sub-
stantive discretion, and the litigation systems in much of the world
deeply distrust judicial discretion in either procedural or substantive
matters.278 Moreover, creating a unified procedural system is more
complex than resolving the discrete procedural components of juries,
judicial discretion, discovery, joinder, and the like. Procedure is like a
spiderweb, and a tug on one strand inevitably affects other strands as
well. 279 The problem is made still more complex because common
law and equity were two forms of litigation run under the auspices of a
single government that was capable of collapsing them together with a
stroke of the pen.28 0 The same cannot be said of merging litigation
and ADR, or merging the systems of the United States, Germany, and
China.
My sense is that, for now, the best course is to concentrate our
attention on the merger of litigation, mediation, and arbitration. The
task, while hardly simple, is simpler. But any solutions that emerge
from this effort must then be evaluated against the competitive pres-
sures that such solutions will face from the international order.
B. The End of Juries?
One of the matters on which ADR and foreign procedural sys-
tems agree is the refusal to use juries as factfinders. Even the Ameri-
can litigation system refuses to use juries in the significant percentage
of cases that are equitable in nature. The most recent data on the
infrequency of civil jury trial suggest a very limited role for juries even
in cases in which they are nominally available. 28 ' And even in that
tiny fraction of cases, strong jury controls exist to override unreasona-
ble jury decisionmaking. 282 The trend line is clear. The civil jury is a
277 See Mentschikoff, supra note 267, at 861; Rau, supra note 121, at 509 (noting
that international "arbitrators are to be allowed a wide margin of creativity in resolv-
ing a dispute, or in devising a remedy, as long as they take care to deploy the right
language").
278 See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
279 I borrow the spiderweb analogy from Fuller's description of polycentrism. See
Fuller, supra note 90, at 395.
280 SeeAct ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (authoriz-
ing the Supreme Court to merge law and equity); FED. R. Crv. P. 2 (merging the two
systems).
281 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
282 See FED. R. Crv. P. 49(a)-(b), 50(a)-(b), 51, 59(a)(1); see also Renee Lettow
Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 195 (2000) (examining the history of the power to comment); Jack B. Wein-
stein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges To Marshall and Comment on the Evidence in
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dying institution in America, an unwelcome institution in other coun-
tries, and a banished institution in alternative methods of dispute
resolution.
Despite his proclivity for tradition and organic growth, even
Pound defended juries only tepidly. 28 3 The jury has been studied ex-
tensively since Pound's day, and like any human institution, it has its
strengths and its weaknesses. 28 4 Whatever the jury's actual merits,
negative perceptions about the jury's unpredictability linger among
foreigners, domestic business interests, and portions of the public. In
terms of people's willingness to accept adjudicatory outcomes, percep-
tions matter.
Writing on a clean slate, lawyers negotiating over the shape of a
hypothesized procedural system would be unlikely to make jury trial a
sticking point that would kill a deal. Jury trial would at most be a
negotiating point, useful to secure a more favorable deal on other
features that mattered more. Of course, we do not write on a clean
slate. Federal and state constitutions present an important series of
hurdles. Furthermore, because citizens' participation in democratic
governance is a critical argument for the use ofjuries,28 5 the conversa-
tion about the future of jury trial must expand beyond the shape of a
procedural system to include the broader question of the scope of
participatory rights in government. Finally, because juries are the
most visible and symbolic manifestation of our system's commitment
to decentralized adjudicatory (and governmental) power, any conver-
sation about abolishing the civil jury must consider the cultural and
political importance of decentralized decisionmaking. Of course, the
abolition ofjuries does not end the American system's commitment to
decentralization; other, more significant manifestations remain. In-
deed, the most significant devolution of adjudicatory authority is not
the jury; rather, it is our system's willingness to permit, and in recent
Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 163 (1988) (arguing
for greater use of the judicial power to comment on the evidence as a jury-control
device). See generally ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVILJURY 243-317 (2001)
(describing rules of evidence and various other procedural rules that control the
jury's decisionmaking).
283 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
284 For a brief summation of the jury's strengths and weaknesses as a decisionmak-
ing institution, as well as a bibliography, see TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 129,
at 1237-39. See also Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First
Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449 (2006) (evaluating jury's difficulties in under-
standing instructions).
285 SeeJAMEs GOBERT, JUSTICE, DEMOCRACY AND THE JURY 99-160, 223-24 (1997);
NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 10-17 (2005); WORLD JURY SYSTEMS, supra note
140, at 7-13.
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years to foster actively, private forms of ADR that place decisionmak-
ing about a dispute's resolution (or, in the case of arbitration, about
the process for resolution) into the hands of the disputants them-
selves. If a merger of adjudicatory and ADR methods can compensate
for the jury's decentralizing role in other ways, one argument for the
retention of juries falls to the wayside.
I raise the possibility of eliminating the right to a civil jury trial
with a heavy heart. I believe in juries, in the sincerity and quality of
their work, and in the vital role they play in our democracy. But logic,
not fond attachments, must underlie the reform of civil procedure.
C. The Fate of the Adversarial System
Unlike his tepid defense of juries, Pound provided no defense of
the adversary system; to the contrary, it was the most memorable foil
of his 1906 speech. 28 6 Because he believed that other procedural re-
forms could temper the win-at-all-costs gamesmanship of this ancient
institution, he never proposed its abolition-even though it seemed
the most evident and logical prescription for his diagnosis of the ills of
the American procedural system. 28 7 For the most part, Pound's bet
did not pay off. Complaints about win-at-all-costs adversarialism still
abound; and, due in part to new bodies of substantive law and the rise
of mass injuries, the system is now more costly and prone to delay
than Pound could have imagined. The marriage of adversarial zeal
and loosely textured, wide-open procedural rules has required signifi-
cant case management controls that have turned modern American
litigation into a hybrid between adversarial and inquisitorial methods.
Just as the trend line points away from jury trial, the trend line points
away from a strong form of adversarialism.
As with civil juries, however, outright abandonment of the adver-
sarial system presents a complicated picture. The constitutional pedi-
gree of the adversarial system is not as unambiguous as that of civil
jury trial, but aspects of the system find footing in the Due Process
Clause.28 8 Like the civil jury, the adversarial system constrains and de-
centralizes the power of the judicial branch, and has assumed a cul-
tural significance in the American understanding of how litigation
should work. Unlike the civil jury, an adversarial approach is used
286 See supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text; see also Shapiro, supra note 111,
at 1975-76 (noting that the drafters of the Federal Rules also had faith that the ex-
cesses of the adversarial system could be controlled).
288 See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 232, at 2-3; supra note 95 and accom-
panying text.
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both in American ADR methods and in other procedural systems in
the world. Taken together, these facts make a case for maintaining
some form of an adversarial approach to litigation.
Stripped of constitutional, cultural, and political overlays, the is-
sue of the adversarial system's future is also a functional one. Adjudi-
cation has certain functions it must perform-principally,
presentation of claims and defenses, issue definition, evidence gather-
ing, marshaling of evidence and arguments, determination of law and
facts, application of fact to law, declaring appropriate remedies, and
ensuring compliance with those remedies.28 9 Interwoven into the
question of how to accomplish these functions is the question of who
should accomplish them. The adversarial system allocates the first
four functions to the parties (or, typically, their lawyers), and the lat-
ter four functions to the court (which, in the American version, some-
times redelegates the factfinding and application functions to the
jury). In the inquisitorial approach, most or all of the first three func-
tions are assumed by the court, with more limited input from the par-
ties and their lawyers. No compelling a priori arguments demand the
choice of one system over another.290 Culture, tradition, and political
allocations of responsibility have filled the logical void. Such factors
are often the most difficult to reform or change.
Therefore, both in his strong critique of American adversarialism
and in his unwillingness to do much about it, Pound may have been
right. American legislatures seem unlikely to invest in the expanded
and professionalized judiciary that the move to a purer form of the
inquisitorial method would require.2 1 It is far from clear that the
American public would be willing to give up on the opportunity to
retain a "hired gun" to protect an individual's interests, or that the
Constitution would tolerate significant departures from the adver-
sarial approach-especially when it is not certain how much more ef-
fective an inquisitorial approach will be.
At the same time, we need to be more realistic about what we can
expect the adversarial system to do. Even in routine cases, the system
289 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
290 Fuller's work constitutes the most compelling argument for adversarial pro-
cess. Fuller, supra note 90. On both descriptive and normative levels, however, his
argument has been contested as a correct analysis of American litigation. See Chayes,
supra note 88; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979). As telling, Fuller's argument illegitimates the
nonadversarial procedural systems of most of the non-Anglo-American world.
291 Cf Langbein, supra note 79, at 848-55 (discussing the professional nature of
the German judiciary)
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provides less litigant control than the model suggests; 2 9 2 and in com-
plex cases, litigant control over attorney behavior is virtually nonexis-
tent. We must create an ethical system that realistically reflects the
roles of attorneys and their clients.
Moreover, admitting that some form of modified adversarial sys-
tem will be with us for the foreseeable future means that we need to
consider other reforms that will make the system run more effectively.
In routine cases, the adversarial system seems to run well enough; it
runs into the greatest difficulty in large-scale litigation. 293 Thus, the
mixture of wide-open joinder and the adversarial system, which has
created intractable procedural and ethical issues, might need to be
reconsidered. More generally, we need to rethink the place ofjudicial
discretion in an adversarial system. The common law system showed
the difficulties of the adversarial system hitched to rigid (and rigidly
enforced) procedure, but the past seventy-five years have shown that
hitching the adversarial system to a procedural system with discretion-
ary rules of pleading, discovery, andjoinder has not been entirely suc-
cessful either. Recent reforms that have tried to make the marriage
work have focused on increasing case management, 294 cutting discov-
ery at the margins,295 penalizing apparent frivolity in pleadings, mo-
292 In reality, lawyers and clients in routine adversarial litigation have little contact,
and clients report that they have little sense of control over their lawsuits. See
Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv.
89.
293 See Kakalik et al., supra note 107, at 636 ("Subjective information from our
interviews with lawyers also suggests that the median or typical case is not 'the prob-
lem.' It is the minority of the cases with high discovery costs that generate the anec-
dotal 'parade of horribles' that dominates much of the debate over discovery rules
and discovery case management.").
294 In 1983, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure added most of
the present Rule 16, explicitly conveying to judges significant case management pow-
ers. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1983 Amendments), 461 U.S.
1095, 1100-03 (1983). In 1993, these powers were augmented. Amendments to Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure (1993 Amendments), 507 U.S. 1089, 1116-18 (1993).
295 In 1983, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure added a propor-
tionality requirement to Rule 26(b). 1983 Amendments, 461 U.S. at 1103-04. In 1993,
this requirement was given its own section (Rule 26(b)(2)), certain forms of
mandatory disclosure were either required or made optional (Rule 26(a)(1)-(3)),
discovery planning became mandatory in many cases (Rule 26(f)), depositions were
limited in number and duration (Rules 30(a)(2) (A), (d)(2)), and interrogatories
were limited in number (Rule 33(a)). 1993 Amendments, 507 U.S. at 1118-22,
1125-26, 1129, 1131-32, 1136. In 2000, the ability of federal district courts to opt out
of the Rule 26 (a) (1) mandatory disclosure requirement was eliminated, and Rule
26(b) (1) was narrowed to allow automatic discovery only for matters relevant to
claims and defenses; discovery into matters relevant only to the subject matter of the
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tions, and discovery, 296 and easing the standard for granting summary
judgment.29 7 But all of these reforms threaten to make the determi-
nation of cases on their merits less likely. Because the potential to
thwart determinations on the merits is one of the principal arguments
against the American adversarial system, these reforms are reinforcing
one of the worst features of the adversarial system even as they seek to
stamp out other evils.
In the end, it may be that the only alternatives to make the adver-
sarial system work are either to limit the types of cases in which the
system is used (for instance,just to fairly routine matters), or to create
economic incentives that align the parties' interests with social goals
(for instance, making each party pay for the discovery it requests or
capping attorneys' fees and hourly rates in such a way that lawyers
have little reason to churn cases). Pound noted the way in which eco-
nomic incentives distorted the proper working of the adversarial sys-
tem a century ago. 298 If the system can survive another century, we
might need to become more serious about the reforming the econom-
ics of litigation and the education of lawyers. 299
lawsuit required a showing of good cause. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 529 U.S. 1155, 1162-65 (2000).
296 In 1983, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expanded Rule
11 to create, for the first time, significant sanctions on pleadings, motions, and other
papers that did not have a reasonable grounding in fact or law. The same amend-
ments also created Rule 26(g), which is the rough equivalent to Rule 11 for discovery
requests and responses. 1983 Amendments, 461 U.S. at 1099-100, 1104. In 1993, the
incentives for filing Rule 11 motions against opponents were limited in order to pre-
vent sharp practices that had arisen as a result of unintended consequences in the
1983 version of Rule 11. But the core requirement that a pleading, motion, or paper
have a reasonable basis was maintained and even expanded. 1993 Amendments, 507
U.S. at 1111-14.
297 This easing was accomplished without a change in the Federal Rules; rather, in
three cases decided in 1986, the Supreme Court softened three prior precedents that
had collectively restricted the broad use of Rule 56. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 327 (1986) ("Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfa-
vored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a
whole ...."); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
298 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
299 SeeJohn C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987, 994-95 (1990).
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D. The Need for Ideas
Great reform movements require the fuel of a pressing social
need, the oxygen of optimism, and the spark of a great idea.3° ° If the
social need to reform the litigation system exists, then we also need a
theory to create the optimism and spark the reform. In a sense, this
entire Article has been about ideas-those that have worked and
those that haven't over the course of the last century. The present
need is to articulate a theory that can guide us into the future. A
guiding theory does not necessarily mean a new theory. As we have
seen, many of Pound's ideas were not new; rather, they were redis-
coveries of ancient ideas applied to new social circumstances. But a
theory of some sort is required. Reform without theory is likely to be
pragmatic, incremental, and above all political-as those in power
tweak the rules slightly in one direction or another. It is unlikely to
meet the pressures of the future.
Let me suggest a couple of characteristics that a successful theory
should possess. First, the theory should be simple and appealing.
Pound's "on the merits" mantra is an example. It is hard to resist its
fundamental truth. Indeed, today we look back over the centuries of
prior legal practice and wonder how the'legal system could ever have
resisted this aphorism's beauty and simplicity. Of course, the devil
with such simple theories is in their detail. But more subtle and com-
plex ideas bear a heavy burden of persuasion. Many theories that can
spearhead reform have a "but of course" quality to them.
Second, the theory should connect procedure and substance. As
I have said, one of Pound's gifts as a legal philosopher was to see the
entire legal system-from the loftiest jurisprudential ideals to the low-
liest trial of a railroad accident-as an integral whole. 30 1 But Pound's
great success was also his great failing: he created an integrated juris-
prudential theory whose procedural half seemed so preferable to the
past that it hung on even as his substantive half slipped from memory.
The result is that procedure and substance have become
disconnected.
As a result, one of two types of procedural theorizing now seems
necessary. The first is to try again to unite substance and procedure.
For instance, if economic efficiency should be the direction of the
substantive law, then we should make procedural efficiency the guid-
ing principle of our procedural system; if the substantive law aims to
300 Whether the social need or the idea comes first is another "chicken and egg"
question that need not distract us.
301 See supra notes 20, 37 and accompanying text.
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achieve greater liberty and autonomy,30 2 we should design the proce-
dural system to vindicate these values instead. A second direction is to
create a robust procedural theory whose norms operate indepen-
dently of the substantive law, and with which the substantive law must
seek accommodation. Various scholars have suggested a number of
possible values that procedure might advance, 303 but, with the excep-
tion of Lon Fuller,30 4 they have not attempted to sketch the full out-
line of the procedural system that might flow from these norms.
As I have suggested, the former approach-harnessing both sub-
stance and procedure in the same yoke-creates certain risks when
procedure becomes the frictionless conduit for undesirable social pol-
icy. 30 5 Despite the danger, however, this approach seems the better
alternative. Lawyers have no monopoly on excellent philosophical
thought, or on sound economic policy. But we do have a millennium-
long tradition of creating and administering adjudicatory structures.
As Holmes observed, "The substance of the law at any given time
pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then under-
stood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to
which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its
past. °30 6 Insisting that substantive theory and policy integrate proce-
dural theory and history perfects substantive law, and also respects the
individuals who encounter substantive legal rules in adjudicatory con-
texts. The next great procedural theory must reconnect procedure
and substance.
CONCLUSION
Unlike Roscoe Pound, in 1906 James Andrews was a household
name in legal circles. He was a well regarded lawyer from New York
who was active in the profession. When Pound finished his "white
flame of progress" speech, another New York lawyer, the inveterate
legal reformer Everett P. Wheeler, 30 7 immediately moved that 4000
302 As mentioned above, history, tradition, and culture must integrate with theory
to shape a procedural system. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
303 See Allison, supra note 96, at 671-82 (listing six values); Michael Bayles, Princi-
ples for Legal Procedure, 5 LAW & PHIL. 33, 45-56 (1986) (listing nine values); Bone,
supra note 96, at 919 (listing three metrics to evaluate procedural rules); Bush, supra
note 96, at 905-20 (listing seven values). See generally TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra
note 129, at 3-27 (discussing possible procedural norms).
304 See Fuller, supra note 90.
305 See supra text following note 87.
306 HOLMES, supra note 9, at 1-2.
307 Wheeler had been interested in issues of procedural reform since the 1890s, see
Burbank, supra note 4, at 1041 n.108, 1045 n.126, and chaired a special ABA commit-
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copies of the speech be printed and circulated among the bar and
bench. The motion required unanimous consent. Andrews took the
floor, decried Pound's "drastic attack," and offered "to show the con-
trary of every one of the material positions taken in the paper."0 8 Andrews
stymied immediate passage of Wheeler's motion, and forced the issue
to be carried over to the business meeting two days later.
In Wigmore's recollection, "[t] he conservatives were hotly impa-
tient to suppress the whole matter," and dominated the business meet-
ing.309 Andrews argued that the early twentieth-century American
judicial system "is the most refined and scientific system ever devised by the
wit of men," and thought Pound's attacks on the judiciary "unconscion-
able. '310 Another lawyer from Texas thought the speech was an effort
"to destroy that which the wisdom of the centuries has built up."'3t1
Only Wheeler rose in defense of Pound. Wheeler ultimately agreed to
amend his motion to refer the matter to the ABA Committee on Judi-
cial Administration and Remedial Procedure. The "conservatives" stri-
dently opposed even this motion, which nonetheless passed.3 12 The
reference led to the formation of a special ABA committee to study
the "evils suggested in Mr. Pound's paper."3 13 The rest, as we like to
say, is history.
If Wigmore's account is true, 314 the reception to Pound's speech
proves again the scriptural admonition about the prophet's difficulty
tee that, in 1909, made a number of recommendations to reduce cost and delay, see
Everett P. Wheeler, The American Bar Association Recommendations as to Judicial Proce-
dure, 21 GREEN BAG 57 (1909). The recommendations bore "unmistakable evidence
of the Pound influence." Justice Tom C. Clark, Address at the Proceedings Honoring
Roscoe Pound (June 17, 1964), in 35 F.R.D. 247, 253 (1964); see Wheeler, supra, at 57
(stating that Pound's speech precipitated the formation of the special committee). In
the early 1920s, although in failing health, Wheeler chaired an ABA committee that
helped lead to passage of legislation limiting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion and expanding its certiorari jurisdiction. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-five Years After theJudges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1643,
1668, 1674 (2000).
308 Wigmore, supra note 1, at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
309 Id.
310 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
311 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
312 Id.
313 Wheeler, supra note 307, at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
314 The accuracy of Wigmore's account, rendered thirty years after the fact, is un-
certain. Pound's speech was published as part of the proceedings of the meeting. See
Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction, supra note 2, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
Pound himself recalled far less strident opposition to his speech during the business
meeting. The minutes of the meeting also suggest that the motion to refer the matter
to the committee was not in doubt. Pound soon became a member of the ABA com-
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in his or her own land.3 15 Pound identified himself as a lawyer-a
new kind of lawyer, no doubt, but nonetheless a professional whose
first responsibility was to the profession and whose first obligation was
the profession's improvement. With hindsight, we know that Pound's
views carried the day-indeed, the century. But, in 1906, even he was
unable to convince leading figures of the bar to recognize the seeds of
change that had sprouted all around them, or to think imaginatively
in light of the times.
Were that same young Pound alive today, he would still be identi-
fying the seeds of social change, would still be dissatisfied with our
procedural system, and would still wish to engage the academy and
profession in the effort to imagine a procedural system capable of re-
sponding to the pressures of the present and the future-not a cen-
tury-old past. Without question, Pound overplayed the strengths of
his proposed solutions, and underplayed their weaknesses. His con-
servatism in matters touching on the legal profession blinded him to
the logical endpoint of his own critique: the abandonment of adver-
sarial process. As their unintended effects have become clear and new
pressures have arisen, we have realized that Pound's concrete propos-
als for procedural reform are inadequate for our time. But Pound's
insistence on examining the social consequences of legal arrange-
ments remains as vital today as it was a century ago. Pound's greatest
contribution-far more important than the principles and rules that
Pound laid down for the historical times he faced-was his spirit of
inquiry, of innovation, of integration of procedure and substance in
the service of the common good.
So it must be for us. "The pure conservative," Whitehead once
observed, "is fighting against the essence of the universe." 3 16 In other
words, history no longer recalls James Andrews. History remembers
Roscoe Pound.
mittee to which Wheeler's motion was referred-suggesting that Pound was not the
pariah described by Wigmore. James Andrews also served on the committee, which
was already in the process of studying issues of expense and delay in American litiga-
tion. See Scott, supra note 4, at 1570-71. Wigmore, of course, was the preeminent
scholar of the law of evidence, and seeing his credibility as an eyewitness come under
attack presents a delicious irony.
315 See Matthew 13:57 (New Revised Standard Version) ("Prophets are not without
honor except in their own country and in their own house.").
316 WHITEHEAD, supra note 256, at 353-54.
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